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EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT IN CANADA 
Canadian equipment purchases had always involved politics, 
right back to the 1880s decision to dress the militia in high cost, 
low quality Canadian made uniforms in deference to Sir John A. 
Macdonald's National Policy. 
Desmond Morton, Understanding Canadian Defence1 
The procurement of military weapons and equipment in Canada 
has often been controlled by partisan political considerations—not 
by a clear desire to increase the military's capability.2 Civilian 
leaders have typically given actual combat strength a low priority, 
thus Canada has often failed to effectively design, produce, or even to 
purchase the weapons and equipment its military needs to carry out 
the priorities of the civil power. Reliance on foreign military equipment 
has often been necessary owing to the limited size of Canadian industry 
and its inability to compete in international markets. This dependence 
on foreign sources has frequently hampered the scheduling of Canadian 
defence acquisitions and created deficiencies regarding operational 
performance. While the need to equip a military for operations is just as 
important as all other factors involved in preparing a national defence 
force, weapons and equipment procurement in Canada has generally 
been extremely inefficient; scandals committed for political gain are not 
unexpected. In order to secure even the most modest materiel, officials 
within the Department of National Defence (DND) have had to comply 
with a succession of rules that can only be described as illogical from 
a standpoint of military performance. The DND has not helped itself, 
however, by making the process more efficient from its end. The internal 
process has continually evolved into an amorphous mass of bureaucracy, 
complicated by a myriad of committees that require endless analysis, re-
evaluations, and approvals. It has been difficult to assess these weak-
nesses fully, however, as the topic has received scant attention from 
Canadian military historians. As David Bercuson asserts: "In any well-
stocked bookstore today, there will be tomes on great military leaders, 
decisive battles, the evolution of strategy and tactics, intelligence, the art 
of war, military leadership, even supplies, logistics, and communications. 
But nothing on procurement."3 Equipment acquisition, therefore, is 
ahistorical in Canada, and the political misdirection of the process means 
valuable lessons are ignored. 
The absence of literature on procurement is most notable during 
the period before Canada's entry into the Great War. There are many 
publications on the early defence policies, attempted reforms, and 
personalities involved in Canada's military development before 1914,4 
but there is still extremely little on how the Canadian military of that 
time equipped itself. One reason is that the political parrying between 
the General Officer Commanding and the government's representative, 
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the Minister of Militia, is a truly fascinating story of political patronage, 
corruption, and lassitude. The other reason is that there is really very little 
to tell. Canada's early militia was very thinly armed; the weaponry used 
was rarely current by international standards, especially with respect to 
the soldier's basic rifle. This was partly because, in this nation's early years, 
Canadian governments believed that the British would always be there 
to save them in the face of an emergency, specifically against the United 
States (US). It was also because these governments had concluded that 
there was little tangible threat from the Americans themselves. In short, 
there was no impetus for Canada's leaders to invest time, energy, and most 
importantly, money, into the Canadian militia. As CP. Stacey asserted: 
"[Canadian] history is full of warlike episodes, and they have proved 
on many occasion that they can be skillful and determined fighters; but 
few nations have shown more profound antipathy to the idea of military 
preparations in time of peace, or less interest in military affairs generally 
except in moments of emergency."5 Nowhere has this lack of preparation 
been more obvious in Canada than in the field of weapons procurement. 
Although Canada has been buying weapons of war since before 
Confederation in 1867, the few historians writing on Canadian acquisitions 
have had a very narrow focus. There exists extensive commentary on 
the Canadian Ross Rifle and the munitions industry of the Great War.6 
Most authors, however, have focused on the industrial defence effort of 
the Second World War and the post-war period, particularly the Avro 
Arrow and the Canada-American defence production (1956) and defence 
development (1963) sharing agreements.7 As Dan Middlemiss noted: 
"Notwithstanding the availability of many useful procurement case 
studies, what is lacking is a general overview of weapons acquisition in 
Canada."8 This trend most likely exists because of the perception that, 
as one historian has put it: "With the exception of a Government Factory 
established in Quebec City in 1882 and the Ross Rifle fiasco of 1904-15, 
the Canadian government made no attempt to establish an armaments 
industry or even to develop an industrial preparedness policy until 
just prior to the Second World War." These efforts offer an incomplete 
understanding of Canadian procurement history. Even the latter study, 
which claims to be a history of Canada's defence industrial policy, 
begins in 1935. Although the present work will not remedy the lack of a 
comprehensive narrative on procurement history, a wider scope of case 
studies will be highlighted to demonstrate the dominant themes. 
********** 
Trends in procurement history began to be revealed even before Canada 
was a nation. In 1862, John A. Macdonald, the first administrator of the 
Militia Affairs portfolio for British North America, received the initial 
indication that the electorate was not willing to invest in its own defence. 
The American Civil War and the subsequent Trent Affair of 1861—where 
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the Federal Navy seized Confederate envoys aboard a British vessel-
had heightened tensions between the United States and Britain. 
Although direct conflict was averted, the British had begun military 
mobilization resulting in increased calls for defence improvements 
in British North America. A Militia Commission was formed in 1862. 
When its recommendations came back within the year, Macdonald used 
them as the basis for introducing a Militia Bill. The commission reported 
a need for a trained force of 50,000 and a reserve of the same size. It 
quickly became clear to the opposition that such a force would cost 
approximately 500,000 dollars and that no such investment was possible; 
instead of proposing amendments, the opposition attacked it absolutely. 
The Cartier-Macdonald ministry was in a weak position at the time, and 
with Macdonald drinking heavily, the bill was poorly defended; it was 
subsequently rejected, and the Cartier-Macdonald ministry resigned the 
next day.10 The bill called for an expenditure that was simply too large 
for a small colony. From the perspective of the British, its rejection meant 
that their colony had no intention of defending itself. This example also 
made politicians in British North America clearly aware that defence 
expenditures were politically dangerous. 
In the 1880s, the government focused on building a public arsenal 
system to produce all war stuffs for the Canadian militia. The Canadians, 
for their part, were also more forthcoming than usual on defence as 
there were riots in Quebec in 1878 and talk of a resurgence of the Irish 
Fenians in the United States.11 The arsenal would be government owned 
because there was no company willing to undertake the scheme. When 
the Conservative administration approved the project at the Citadel in 
Quebec City in 1880, however, it was decided that only ammunition 
would be produced. Guns and other necessities would, for the most part, 
still come from England. Cost was always the biggest factor in further 
developing the arsenal; it remained little more than an assembly plant for 
expensive British import materials to create a small amount of cartridges. 
As one author put it: "Canadians, having become accustomed to bearing 
no responsibility, and little of the cost of their own defence ... in view 
of the ever decreasing external threat from the USA, thought that any 
expense, however small, was a waste of money."12 In addition, it never 
became a full arsenal system with competing contractors because it was 
politically healthier for the government to reserve the small number of 
contracts for industrial friends. Politicians were certainly not going to 
turn these patronage possibilities over to the military for the sake of 
development and efficiency; they were reserved for loyal party followers 
who happened to be interested in the military.13 The nature of early 
Canadian equipment procurement was one of political favouritism. 
Weaknesses in Canadian equipment during the South African War 
of 1899-1902 placed pressure on the government to acquire a new rifle for 
the militia. For the first time, thoughts regarding defence materialized 
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into serious interest in weapons procurement. In 1902, the Minister of 
Militia, Frederick Borden, investigated whether British weapon designers 
would come to Canada and build them a rifle. It was believed that it 
would be more practical to have the guns built domestically in order to 
be able to produce more in a time of crisis. After this failed to create any 
interest, Borden decided that Canada would adopt its own rifle made in 
Canada and designed by a local entrepreneur, Sir Charles Ross.14 The 
government subsidized the production of the Ross and it became one 
of Canada's first weapons purchased primarily for political reasons. As 
Ronald Haycock pointed out: 
political manipulation of procurement was rifebecause acquisitions 
came under the civilian sphere of the defence department, where 
they were controlled by the Deputy Minister. The military had no 
input into this area until well after the turn of the century, and 
even then acquisition would remain more a political process than 
a military one. Most often in the post-Confederation decades, 
the civilian contractors had to be of an acceptable political 
persuasion, as the Canadian Militia was constituent based and 
highly politicized, and because few cared about defence.15 
Ross was subsequently given a contract in 1902, as well as a twenty-
five acre site to build a factory in Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier's 
constituency near Quebec City. He paid a dollar a year for rent. But 
between 1904 and 1907, Ross failed to produce the amount of rifles 
stipulated in the contract. His political friendships ensured that he was 
still paid in full, however.16 
At the Imperial Conference of 1909 on the naval and military defence 
of the Empire, Sir Richard B. Haldane, the British secretary of state for 
war, inquired: "Are the Dominions prepared to adopt as far as possible 
imperial patterns of arms, equipment, and stores?"17 Borden, who was still 
the Canadian minister of militia, responded that he agreed that all arms 
should be identical, and the only reason that Canada had a different service 
rifle than the British Lee Enfield was that he could not convince English 
manufacturers to come to Canada and establish factories. He assured 
Haldane that the rifle chosen used the same ammunition as the service 
rifle of the Imperial army and, therefore, there would be little difficulty in 
coordination. Borden felt certain Canada was poised propitiously to unite 
with the Imperial military, and he confidently stated that using British 
models simply made sense without diminishing Canadian autonomy. The 
dedication to being independent militarily was, therefore, not the primary 
consideration, and the Canadians were very receptive to the Imperial 
military pattern regarding their equipment. If they could procure British 
style kit, they did. 
The rest of the story of the Ross Rifle is well documented elsewhere.18 
What should be noted is that Canada's attempt to build its own weapon 
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was universally determined to be a failure on the battlefield. The Ross 
was an excellent target rifle, but it was deficient as a service weapon. It 
was unable to fire rapidly without overheating and seizing up. On the 
battlefields of Ypres it was reported that some 3,000 men cast aside their 
Canadian rifles—most jammed with mud—and armed themselves with 
British weapons.19 In a strange twist that highlights the political bent of 
the matter, Ross eventually sued the government for 3 million dollars, 
and was given 2 million dollars in an out-of-court settlement after the 
Deputy Minister of Justice advised them that Ross had a strong case 
owing to the vagueness of his contract.20 
The Canadian service rifle was not the only piece of kit that was 
considered a failure. The Canadian contingent was originally to be 
supplied with its own boots and greatcoats, but because of profiteering, 
much of the manufactured equipment was of very poor quality compared 
to British products. Two million boots ordered by the War Office were 
useless as they were made largely of cardboard and fell apart in the 
rain.21 Canadian coats were also too thin and inferior for British use. The 
Canadian Service Wagon, although reportedly deemed of high quality, 
was also eventually rejected as its turning radius was too large for 
English and European roads.22 The McAdam shovel-shield carried by all 
Canadian soldiers was useless for digging and cutting wire; they were 
sold for scrap in 1917.23 The Dominion's primary contribution was artillery 
shell production. The Shell Committee was created on 6 September 1914. 
But because of political patronage, profiteering, production failures, and 
extensive delays in shell delivery, it, too, was largely a failure.24 Although 
shell production was revamped and improved over the course of the 
war, Canadian attempts to deviate from British weapons and equipment 
models did not succeed. 
By the end of the First World War, the failure of Canada's indigenous 
military equipment25 irreparably shook the country's confidence in its 
domestic military industry. Moreover, the war had weakened Canada 
financially. It became, therefore, more expedient for the Canadian 
government to use British models than to pay for independent research 
and development for its own specific equipment needs. Notwithstanding 
a constant Canadian quest for independence—best illustrated by its 
insistence on a separate signature at Versailles and its independent 
membership in the League of Nations—Canada still deemed it expedient 
to use British military prototypes. Naturally, the British did not alter their 
designs to meet Canadian requirements; equipment specifications were 
dictated to Canada. Moreover, Canada was not often able to recommend 
changes to British designs, as that would have inevitably delayed 
procurement. Because the Canadian equipment base was already quite 
sparse, they simply could not wait for suitable machines to be designed. 
This meant that Canada was constantly seeking approval for modifications 
to their own equipment, which was rarely possible at least partly due to 
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the difficulty of exchanging blueprints.26 The historic lack of investment 
in the defence industry often hindered Canadian military capability 
and foreign equipment purchases have placed the military at the mercy 
of foreign technologies, processes, and political decisions. In the event 
of a crisis, Canada could easily lose its supplier, which was common 
practice in the post-war era. The Canadian government did not desire 
any freedom concerning equipment designs, and this trend continued at 
the Imperial Conference of 1926 where Imperial standardization again 
became absolute.27 
The 1929 stock market crash hindered expenditures on the Canadian 
military but there was also a theme of anti-militarism resonating 
throughout the international community in the late twenties and early 
thirties. Popular rhetoric at the time held that international conflicts were 
fomented by private enterprise armament industries.28 A l l three Canadian 
military services were drastically reduced; the Royal Canadian Navy 
(RCN) was almost abolished completely.29 Despite increasing indicators 
that there could be another international conflict, equipment acquisition 
in Canada was not a priority. When the government finally did attempt to 
manufacture a light machine gun for the Army in 1938, it simply became 
another example of the political nature of procurement in Canada. As 
early as the summer of 1936, the DND came to the conclusion that it would 
be necessary to arm the Canadian Forces with the Bren gun.30 While an 
Interdepartmental Committee on Armament Contracts was appointed by 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King in January 1937 to report on the control 
of profits for these contracts, the government was still inexperienced with 
the intricacies of contracting and weapons development.31 On 31 March 
1938, a contract to produce 7,000 Bren guns was signed with the John Inglis 
Company of Toronto. When the British War Office decided to purchase 
5,000 of the guns, the order increased to 12,000 units, and it appeared that 
Canada was successfully involved in its own defence production. The 
contract was quickly criticized, however, as only the John Inglis company 
was given an opportunity to tender the bid.32 
A Royal Commission was appointed to investigate the situation 
and concluded that the Interdepartmental Committee on Profit Control 
provided inadequate protection against profiteering. It recommended 
that any negotiations between the government and private manufacturers 
regarding armament contracts should be placed in the hands of an expert 
advisory group of competent businessmen.33 The Canadian government 
subsequently brought in legislation to establish a Defence Purchasing 
Board (DPB).34 This transferred control of military acquisitions from 
the DND to a civilian agency. But as CP. Stacey astutely asserted, there 
was nothing wrong with purchasing the gun from a sole source as it 
had been decided that it was necessary from the standpoint of military 
capability. He correctly wrote: "this proved to be one more case where 
political considerations took precedence over military expediency with 
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unfortunate results."35 The Canadian government, however, was not 
competent in the direct involvement of arms acquisition or production 
in the 1930s. The contract also illustrated the struggle between private 
industry and the Canadian government as to who should take primary 
responsibility for the construction of materiel. 
The Second World War forced the Canadian government to invest in 
its defence industry, and domestic production effectively supplemented 
the traditional British source. Britain was economically devastated by the 
war and could not help arm Canada. Domestic industry subsequently 
became responsible for Anson and Harvard training planes, Mosquito 
fighter bombers, Hurricane fighters, and Lancaster heavy bombers. None 
of the planes were designed in Canada, and no aircraft engines were 
produced domestically.36 Canada still did not have trained engineers 
for its own defence design and construction, and Canadian industry 
continued to use foreign models. Examples from Britain included the 
25-pounder field guns, 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns, 2-pounder anti-tank 
guns, and Boys anti-tank rifles.37 During the war, 815,729 transport 
vehicles and trucks were built in Canada, representing one of its most 
distinguished industrial achievements. This situation was facilitated by 
American dominance over the Canadian automobile industry.38 
Canadian industry also built corvettes, frigates, and Tribal class 
destroyers for the RCN.39 Although four were ordered in Canada in 1941, 
the Tribals were not completed until the end of the war; other tasks had 
been prioritized. Canadian Minister of National Defence J.L. Ralston later 
claimed that the delay was actually because of the British admiralty's 
unwillingness to lend naval personnel to help Canada construct the 
destroyers.40 Indeed, the lack of weapons specialists in Canada created 
many difficulties for the RCN. This was most notable in the field of anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), which Canada focused on during the war. As 
W.G.D. Lund argued: "It was through its commitment to anti-submarine 
warfare that Canada was able to gain some measure of control in the 
Battle of the Atlantic."41 
The RCN played a role second only to the RN in the protection 
of trade routes in the North Atlantic and this created a need for highly 
developed ASW technology. The RCN had to keep pace with the science 
of radar, asdic, high frequency direction finding, and offensive anti-
submarine weapons (for example, the Hedgehog ahead-throwing mortar). 
At the outbreak of the war, however, there was not a single technical or 
scientific advisor in Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa. A l l of the 
RCN's weaponry came from Britain, and after the war started and British 
supplies disappeared, they were on their own. The attempt to design 
and procure advanced technology necessary for the success of the RCN 
in the North Atlantic has been described as "a national failure."42 David 
Zimmerman noted that 
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Even in weapon design their efforts were a failure because of the 
dissimilar priorities of the institutions involved and the inevitable 
conflict that developed between them. The National Research 
Council of Canada, the supreme wartime scientific agency, and 
Naval Service Headquarters did not succeed in resolving their 
difficulties, the effects of which on the anti-submarine campaign 
were profound as RCN escorts went to sea with inferior, outdated, 
or unusable equipment. 
One exception regarding weapons design in Canada was the 
Ram tank. Although it was based on the American M-3 medium tank, 
Canadian engineers believed the fixed gun to be a liability. A Canadian 
prototype was built in twenty months and the tank had a cast steel 
hull, a large revolving turret on a 72-inch ring, and a 75mm calibre gun. 
It used an American engine. Not only did American defence officials 
agree that it was a sound model, they installed the Canadian turret 
and gun on what came to be known as the M-4 Sherman tank.43 But 
as with the Lancaster and the Tribals, Canadian inexperience resulted 
in lengthy production delays. There were also engineering and armour 
plate problems as well as a high final cost for the Ram relative to the 
Sherman. The Sherman subsequently became the main battle tank of the 
Allies, and the Canadian armoured divisions were only equipped with 
Rams until they could be replaced by the American model.44 Although 
the decision to switch to the Sherman due to the inability of domestic 
industry to produce a tank quickly and cheaply was well-advised, the 
disadvantages of purchasing military equipment rather than producing 
it in Canada became obvious after the war. Minister of National Defence 
Brooke Claxton was forced to write to the US defense secretary as a last 
resort in 1949 to try to procure improved bogie wheels and treads for 
Canadian Shermans. His attempt failed because it was claimed that they 
were needed for American units.43 
Canada did have the option to purchase some military materiel 
in the United States during the war. In August 1940, Prime Minister 
King and President Roosevelt signed the Ogdensbnrg Agreement, which 
established the Permanent Joint Board of Defence meant to facilitate 
discussions on the defence of the continent. The Hyde Park Declaration 
that approved a statement by the Joint War Production Committee of 
Canada and the United States calling for a combined production effort46 
was subsequently signed in December 1941. The relationship with the 
United States regarding joint defence production during World War Two, 
however, did not completely replace the British agreement.47 This trend 
gradually changed in the post-war period. The Canadian government 
made the decision to standardize American pattern military material in 
1947, and all three Canadian military services subsequently moved, to 
varying degrees, towards that goal48 As Peter Archambault explained, 
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however, defence ties with Britain remained substantial despite their 
lack of formality, and Canada still purchased British equipment when it 
was advantageos to do so.49 
By the time of the Second World War, many defence products 
were built in Canada and in tandem with its new continental partner. 
Although after the war the Canadian government did finally accept the 
concept of military preparedness in peacetime to a certain degree, the 
Canadian military was still forced to rely on a combination of foreign 
options because it did not maintain its defence industry.50 While the 
transfer to the American production scheme was due to proximity and a 
burgeoning economic co-operation between the two nations, it was also 
a symbol of casting off the yoke of the British Empire and conducting 
business under more favourable conditions.31 
The Canadian government's endorsement in the late 1940s of the 
construction of an all-weather jet-fighter interceptor—the CF-100—is one 
example of a Canadian effort to advance its defence industry and procure 
domestically. But the aircraft failed to make an impact on the international 
market because of a lack of Canadian industrial experience in defence 
production and in meeting deadlines. The design proved that Canadian 
industry could create superior weapons technology, but its inexperience 
in manufacturing hurt the project. Canadian industry had also engaged 
in an overly ambitious endeavour; one company tried to make its first-ever 
jet engine even as it built a modern fighter. The company that was to build 
the new engines and the CF-100 was A.V. Roe (Avrò) Canada; it began 
operating in November 1945. It was announced in January 1947 that the TR5 
engine, later known as the Orenda, would be ready at the end of August 
1949 and that the CF-100 could "tentatively" fly by that same time.52 While 
this was a year later than first expected, it was progress never before seen 
in Canada.33 While this innovation in aircraft was impressive, it was still 
late and firm production schedules have always been vital to any defence 
acquisition. The United States was originally interested in the CF-100, as 
it was determined to be a high quality fighter, but American officials were 
firm that they could only use it if it was available before September 1952. 
The United States never acquired the aircraft, as the first delivery of the 
CF-100 was completed on 30 September 1953. By the end of the Korean War, 
only ninety fighters had been built compared to the 1,000 F-86s that were 
produced in Canada during the same time.54 The Canadian government 
had spent almost 750 million dollars from start to finish, and it sold a 
total of only fifty-three CF-100 aircraft to Belgium in 1957.55 Despite the 
increased budget allotments generated by the Korean crisis, the Canadian 
defence industry was simply too immature to undertake such a project, 
and the aircraft were simply not ready when they were needed in 1950.56 
The long history of Canadian reliance on foreign sources up to that time 
rendered the country largely unable to successfully produce advanced 
military technology independently. 
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A major exception to the reliance on foreign sources for equipment 
was the Canadian-designed, St. Laurent class anti-submarine warfare 
escorts of the Royal Canadian Navy. Radically new ships were needed to 
counter the threat of Soviet submarine innovations.57 
Canada was committed to international security by this time, 
and the 1949 Defence white paper announced that a new type of escort 
ship designed especially for Canadian needs was under construction.''8 
Captain R. Baker of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors proposed that 
Canada construct a new design largely based on the British Intermediate 
Class destroyer, but with the addition of a continuous forecastle to allow 
for more space for the operations rooms and communication centres 
needed by modern vessels. 
Unfortunately, no Canadian shipyard was experienced in preparing 
naval designs; they had always relied on the British. Moreover, the 
technical offices at Naval Service Headquarters were not staffed as a 
warship-design authority. The Canadian government accepted the idea 
of a ship designed in Canada and subsequently authorized the growth 
of the engineer-in-chief's department. The department—supported by 
civilian engineers, technologists, and project managers—expanded 
from five officers in 1948 to twenty-one. A Naval Central Drawing Office 
was also created for the first time, and the Naval Central Procurement 
Agency was organized as an offshoot.59 Davis concluded that "this new 
professional core gave the RCN the ability to design its own warships 
from scratch, rather than merely copying those of other Navies." 60 
The St. Laurent class anti-submarine warfare escorts were, as 
noted above, generally based on the British Intermediate Class destroyer 
design, but it was completely redrawn to meet modern Canadian needs. 
In addition to extra space for operations and communications, the 
improved design provided passageways and excellent access routes to 
facilitate the rapid closing down of the vessel. These were the first ships 
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to provide such 
arrangements for closure as a means of defence against nuclear, biological, 
and chemical attack.61 For the first time, the RCN had designed a major 
war vessel. The inexperience in weapons and equipment design was still 
apparent, however, as financial planning for the original program proved 
highly inaccurate; the final cost was at least three times greater than first 
projected. Naval planners also wanted domestic industry to be able to 
fully support the ships, thus the major systems had to be developed or 
manufactured in Canada. This resulted in myriad delays as many of the 
pieces had to start on the drawing board, and indecision regarding the 
final shape, weapons, and electronic suite to be used prevailed. The St. 
Laurents were not operational until 1955—three years behind schedule.62 
Such a situation places any procurement at risk of cancellation. But as 
Michael Hennessy noted: "The perceived likelihood of general war, 
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however, distracted the government's attention from matters of ultimate 
cost." 63 The project was also marred by the fact that they were quickly 
shown to be ineffective against modern submarines; they were too slow 
and the range of their hull-mounted sonar and anti-submarine weapons 
was too short.64 They needed upgrades soon after their introduction 
to the RCN. Although the St. Laurents are a rare example of industrial 
independence in Canadian procurement history, it was apparent that 
having a platform designed strictly for Canadian needs was a costly and 
time-consuming venture. 
The impact of American weapons systems in Canada after World 
War Two was neither immediate nor total. When it came time to send 
the Canadian Army Special Force to Korea in the spring of 1951, it was 
equipped with Second World War, British-pattern equipment.65 The 
infantry's rifle was the bolt-action Lee Enfield .303 No. 4, Mk. I. The 
army's anti-tank guns, mortars, small arms, tanks, field artillery, radios, 
signals equipment, and helmets were all from the previous war.66 Once in 
Korea, the Canadian army began to adopt American pattern weapons and 
equipment—such as the M2 semi-automatic rifle and the Thompson sub-
machine gun—in piecemeal fashion.67 Although this placed Canada within 
a more recognizable North American framework, it continued the trend of 
trying to adapt foreign designs to Canadian needs. The Korean War had 
also spurred the Canadian government to increase defence spending.68 
On 5 February 1951, Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton told 
the House of Commons that the government intended to undertake a 
three-year, five-billion-dollar defence program. The program included: 
standardization on American military equipment, shipment of obsolete 
United Kingdom pattern equipment to Korea and Canada's NATO allies, 
and closer coordination of defence production with the United States.69 
A few days later, Prime Minister St. Laurent created the Department of 
Defence Production (DDP) to oversee Canadian rearmament.70 Under 
the leadership of CD. Howe, the Canadian government possessed a new 
administrative agent to control its defence procurement program even 
as it absorbed the Canadian Commercial Corporation and Canadian 
Arsenals Limited, which had previously functioned under the broad 
rubric of the Department of Trade and Commerce.71 
One of the primary areas of investment was aircraft to meet the 
Sovietbomber threat. The military desire for a domestic source for aircraft 
continued after the war and the result was the penultimate procurement 
failure in Canadian history—the CF-105, or as it is more commonly 
known, the Avro Arrow. Even Canadian citizens with no interest in 
military history have heard of the Avro Arrow. Since it is perhaps the 
one topic in the procurement field that has received adequate academic 
attention, a simple outline of the principal events will suffice here.72 The 
CF-100 was outdated and no match for Soviet aircraft by 1953.73 The 
answer was the CF-105 supersonic, twin-engined, all-weather jet fighter. 
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The project had been in development in 1949 and was accepted by the 
Liberal government in 1953. By 1955, the necessary redesigns of the 
airframe and fire-control system put it vastly over budget. The Liberal 
government continued to pour money into the venture in the hopes of 
creating the world's best jet interceptor to counter the appearance of the 
Soviet supersonic intercontinental bomber in 1954, but production delays 
continued. To make matters worse, nobody wanted to buy it; it was 
completely unproven, especially the avionics and weapons systems, and 
Canada still did not have a reputation for building jet aircraft. As with 
the CF-100, the lack of experience in designing and producing military 
materiel was a major liability. Dan Middlemiss correctly wrote that 
by 1956, the development of the "Arrow" had burgeoned into 
an all Canadian programme despite the initial intentions by 
the government to keep Canadian participation strictly limited. 
As later events were to demonstrate, an attempt of this sort 
to develop and produce all the major components for a major 
weapons system by inexperienced manufacturers was almost 
predestined to fail ... no allowance was made for the inevitable 
development problems and delays that would be encountered in 
such an ambitious project.74 
The former chief of the general staff, Lieutenant-General Guy 
Simonds, criticized the project at the time for consuming too much of the 
defence budget and ignoring the trend towards ground-to-air missiles. 
He realized, however, that the desire of the air force, the aircraft industry, 
and defence research scientists to participate in a project they could call 
their own swept aside any opposition to the venture.75 
By 1957, the Liberals happily passed the problem on to the new 
Conservative government under John Diefenbaker. On the same day the 
first Arrow prototype rolled off the Avro line, the Soviets launched Sputnik 
I into orbit. The age of intercontinental ballistic missiles had begun, 
and the rationalization behind the Arrow quickly began to fade. On 20 
February 1959, the Diefenbaker government scuttled the entire project, 
and Avro was forced to fire 14,000 employees. The existing prototypes 
were subsequently destroyed without explanation. The initial reason for 
the cancellation of the Arrow was that it was obsolete in the missile age 
and that the American Bomarc defence missile was more appropriate. The 
truth was that the aircraft had simply taken too long to produce and had 
become too expensive. The Diefenbaker government had little information 
on the project and even less desire to search it out. As Desmond Morton 
asserted: "In power, he [Diefenbaker] had taken one hard look at the costs 
of technological independence, quailed, and fled." 76 
The Arrow was not the only attempt to design and produce a weapon 
system for export in the 1950s. Between 1948 and 1955, the Canadian Army 
Research and Development Establishment (CARDE) developed a 3.2 inch, 
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medium anti-tank round called the Heller. CARDE considered it to be 
more accurate than the 17- and 25-pound "pot sabot" round, and it could 
be carried and fired by an individual soldier. The Canadian Army adopted 
the weapon between 1956 and 1960. The real goal, however, was to have 
it procured by both the British and the Americans to improve the level 
of standardization within the North Atlantic Triangle. Canadian hopes 
were dashed when the British purchased the Karl Gustav from Sweden 
instead. The British felt no compulsion to support Canadian weapons 
development and did not defend the decision to Canadian officials.77 
There was also the Canadian Bobcat armoured personnel carrier 
(APC) meant to carry troops quickly into the field in the case of war. 
The design began in 1953, and by 1956 a prototype had been created. 
Although the Cabinet Defence Committee approved its development 
that year, by 1958 Canada was still unable to generate any interest from 
Britain or the United States. The Canadian Army had hoped that it 
would be the standard NATO APC The British and the Americans had 
their own models under development, however, and their projects took 
only half the time to get to the same point. It was not until 1964 that the 
Cabinet Defence Committee finally gave up on the Bobcat project due 
to cost and remaining technical problems. The Canadian Army then 
looked to the American model of M-113s for its APC requirement. As 
Peter Archambault noted: "The Bobcat and Arrow projects had met the 
same fate, for the same reasons: cost overruns; no foreign market; and the 
failure of the manufacturers concerned to make a successful transition 
from development to production of the prototypes." 78 
The failure of the Arrow program had the most profound effect 
on the political will to design and produce weapons and equipment in 
Canada. After the Arrow program was first curtailed in September 1958, 
the Canadian government began discussing the future of the Canadian 
defence industry with the United States; the conclusion was to forego 
independent Canadian weapons production and enter into production-
sharing agreements with American defence firms for major projects. 
Canadian military officials had very little involvement in this decision, 
and it was clear that politicians were going to handle the procurement 
strategy. The government's objective was to increase the participation 
of Canadian industry in the production and support of weapons and 
equipment used in North American defence. But Canada could not afford 
to do so without some form of sharing agreement between the two nations. 
The Canadian defence industry was weakened by the Arrow project 
and needed help from its neighbour. The American government agreed 
that this was an effective way for Canada to contribute to continental 
defence and a series of defence production and development sharing 
arrangements were concluded near the end of 1958.79 
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The industrial defence alliance with the United States obviated 
the creation of a Canadian industrial defence base focusing on domestic 
designs. Grieg Stewart succinctly surmised the advantages of a domestic 
industrial defence base, writing that 
when Canada spends money in Canada to design, develop, 
and manufacture high technology products ... the unit cost of 
such items is not of overriding importance. The money spent in 
Canada to provide jobs for Canadian workers who in turn pay 
taxes and buy goods and services strengthens other Canadian 
companies and the economy as a whole. Design, research, and 
development are investments in the future, raising the level 
of Canadian technology and lowering our reliance on foreign 
technology and expertise.80 
But others have pointed out the difficulties with such an attitude; 
John Treddenick, for example, asked the following question: 
How should one treat a particular defence production activity 
which generates considerable domestic employment but produces 
a weapons system at greater cost than an equivalent [product]. 
On the one hand it contributes to the goal of full employment, 
yet on the other, it reduces the military capability which could 
be achieved from a limited defence budget. In the absence of a 
higher order criterion, such trade-offs are difficult to disentangle 
and economic significance difficult to assess.81 
Dan Middlemiss, another of the relatively few Canadian authors 
writing about this topic, argues that defence procurement is a vital 
component of defence policy: "It is what puts the 'arms' into the armed 
forces and because of the many (sometimes very large) contracts and 
jobs involved, it is also "big business" in Canada." 82 But as Treddenick 
revealed in 1988, the overall impact of defence procurement as a factor 
in the Canadian economy was minimal. He wrote that "total defence 
production accounts for considerably less than 1 per cent of both gross 
domestic product (GDP) and total employment."83 None-the-less, 
Middlemiss's point still holds. There are still very large contracts to 
be had, and in Canada, economic offsets, regional development, and 
employment matters can be more important than the military operational 
requirement. As Dr. Craig Stone concluded, "despite the relatively small 
impact to the overall economy, the dominance of domestic economic 
and political considerations in Canadian defence capital spending, to 
the relative neglect of security or strategic military factors, is the normal 
defence climate in Canada." 84 
The Canadian government lost the sovereignty it was desperately 
trying to gain when it procured all its military equipment from Britain 
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before and after the First World War. It was necessary for the government 
to invest in industry and in research and development, train its labour 
pool, and attempt to stay current with military technology removed from 
foreign dependence. This would have ensured military preparedness 
for the Canadian nation that still had full intentions of going to war to 
defend Britain. The investment in domestic designs and sources of supply 
would have given the military a distinct identity, ensured sovereignty 
in crisis situations, fostered national economic growth, and given 
the defence industry the experience it would need for future warfare. 
Canadian governments have largely chosen to avoid the costs of such a 
commitment, and by the end of the 1950s, they had a good alternative. 
Industrial co-operation with the United States was an exceptional 
example of continental unity for the defence of North America. It was, 
for the most part, a fluid and symbiotic relationship for the production 
of war material. When problems did arise, several vital avenues of 
communication, such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) 
and the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), helped to mitigate the 
situation. If Canada deemed it necessary to procure foreign weapons and 
equipment, then the industrial arrangements and agreements with the 
United States were the best system to fall back on. 
This is clearly only a snapshot of the history of procurement in 
Canada up to the 1960s. It does, however, explain that Canada had, to 
that point, relied mostly on foreign sources for its equipment. Canadian 
industry rarely designed its own weapons. The most common course 
was for the DND and the government to purchase foreign prototypes 
and then alter them to meet Canadian needs. This practice invariably led 
to delays in the procurement process. The attempt to create a domestic 
industrial base to tailor weapons and equipment to specific Canadian 
military requirements also rarely met with success. Inexperience with 
design and production usually resulted in recurring delays and escalating 
costs. As with the case of the Arrow, the longer a defence project goes on 
in Canada, the more politically vulnerable it becomes. There is no better 
evidence of this than the multiple attempts to replace the fleet of Sea King 
maritime helicopters. 
The Sea King helicopters were first acquired in 1963 to provide an 
anti-submarine warfare platform to counter the rapidly evolving Soviet 
submarine threat during the Cold War.85 The initial idea was to operate 
helicopters aboard a Canadian aircraft carrier. The decision had already 
been made to procure an old and stagnant carrier from the British and 
attempt to modify it in order to keep costs down. This was, after all, the 
Canadian way to acquire weapons and equipment for its military. The 
carrier was later named HMCS Bonaventnre and was entirely Canadian 
owned.86 Its purchase also followed the dominant theme of politics in 
Canadian procurement. As David Bercuson asserted in 2005, "Her 
Majesty's Canadian Ship Bonaventure, the last Canadian aircraft carrier, 
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was built in the United Kingdom and acquired by Canada in part to 
maintain Canada-UK defence ties at a time when Canada was starting to 
turn to the United States for many military requirements." 87 
The use of rotary wing aircraft aboard smaller destroyer escort 
vessels instead of aircraft carriers in the 1950s was a distinctly Canadian 
advance. The pressing concern at the time was that, although the 
St. Laurent class vessels were entering service and plans for a new 
Mackenzie class were underway, the RCN still did not have enough 
ships for its international commitment to ASW, and they were concerned 
about obsolescence. The Chief of the Naval Staff stated that the use of 
helicopters could be "a marked step towards making up the deficiencies 
in the lack of surface escorts." 88 More importantly, Canada had only 
one carrier, and if the aircraft could be retrofitted to fly from escorts and 
destroyers, it would vastly increase the RCN's capability. The technical 
innovations used by Canadian engineers to carry this out changed how 
ASW operations were conducted by every other modern navy in the 
world, including those of Britain and the United States.89 Discussions 
on the procurement of a fleet of ASW helicopters for the RCN had been 
ongoing since 1954, and by 1961, officials were still wavering over which 
aircraft to buy. This was largely because of the uncertainty of the exact 
role helicopters were going to fill in the RCN and to rivalries between the 
three Canadian services: army, air force, and navy. 
The helicopter-carrying escort concept had been formally accepted 
in Canada by the 1960s and this allowed procurement officials to better 
define their requirements, always the first step to any procurement in 
Canada. Throughout this period, the process included: a definition of 
military requirement; validation of the requirement; government approval 
of the project; selection of a procurement strategy; bid solicitation and 
source selection; negotiation and an award of contract; administration of 
the contract to purchase the piece of equipment decided upon; and finally, 
delivery of the product.90 While these core phases have been present since 
the 1960s, the time it took to complete them increased continually. It is 
fascinating to note that the first ever Staff Requirements written for naval 
helicopters in the 1950s was not even two pages long.91 
The actual acquisition of a maritime helicopter remained elusive 
for the navy, however, as their vision surpassed the actual specifications 
of any existing model; they could see the future and they refused to 
recommend a purchase that would soon be outdated. The key difficulty 
that was eventually encountered was that since the RCN was the only navy 
considering flying helicopters from smaller ships, it had difficulty finding 
a capable aircraft of the desired size. It was clear that Canadian industry 
could not produce the technology that they demanded in an aircraft and 
they could only watch for new developments being designed by their allies, 
most notably their principal source of helicopters, the United States. 
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The winning helicopter was eventually called the Sea King and 
forty-three were delivered between 1963 and 1969; they became an integral 
component of Canadian naval operations. But the ASW capability of the 
Sea King began to lag behind subsurface technology by the late 1970s and 
discussions to replace the fleet began officially in 1975. It began as a low 
priority project, as they had just completed delivery in 1969, but the Sea 
Kings were designed in the 1950s, so it was not unusual for them to begin 
to discuss future possibilities in 1975. Although it was not at the top of the 
list during the late 1970s-early 1980s, considerations for the replacement 
of the helicopter fleet had to begin early as the procurement process itself 
for major acquisitions had already revealed itself with the original Sea 
King purchase to be a long one. As always, after the need was identified 
by the DND, the process moved to the creation of the Staff Requirements, 
which was by then called the Statement of Requirement (SOR). 
After Pierre Trudeau and the Liberals came to power in 1968, a 
Management Review Group was appointed by the new Minister of 
National Defence, Donald Macdonald, to examine all aspects of DND 
management. Their final report, entitled The Management of Defence in 
Canada and submitted in July 1972, stated: 
Effective coordinative management is lacking despite the obvious 
need and, in consequence, there is no focal point of accountability 
for performance ... it is because of failure to adequately assess the 
financial and technological risks inherently faced in procurement 
programs that there is a corresponding failure to accommodate 
those risks in either the planning or administration of the 
program as events unfold.92 
They subsequently recommended that all research, engineering, 
and procurement be consolidated under one Assistant Deputy Minister, 
Materiel (ADM Mat). The person filling this role had to be a civilian 
with experience in industry. The report maintained that procurement 
of military equipment should fall solely within the DND owing to its 
complexity and cost, and these specific items would be handled by the 
new ADM instead of through the Department of Supply and Services 
(DSS). The DSS replaced the DDP in 1969. They believed this change 
would provide a focal point of accountability. Before the report was 
published that year, it was announced by a new MND, Edgar Benson, 
that the military and civilian elements of the DND and Canadian Forces 
Headquarters would be integrated into a new Canadian National Defence 
Headquarters (NDHQ). The new position of ADM (Mat) was created 
within the new organizational structure. 
Adding to the procurement problems of weak project management, 
risk assessment, accountability, and an overall lack of policy outlined by the 
Management Review Group, the money for new equipment disappeared 
in the early 1970s. The only bright spot for procurement was the four 
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new Tribal DHH 280 Iroquois class gas turbine destroyers that arrived in 
Halifax in 1972. The ships had been promised by the government in 1964 
after extensive scheduling delays, lack of design finalization, and massive 
cost overruns led to the cancellation of the General Purpose Frigate in 
1963.93 The savings resulting from Bonaventure's retirement made it 
possible for the RCN to revitalize part of its surface fleet by procuring 
the new destroyers. The commissioning of HMCS Iroquois, the first to 
enter service, took place on 29 July. The ships were expressly designed 
and produced in Canada for integrated helicopter ASW operations.94 
But as with the other ship building programs, the one for the 280 was 
characterized by inept project management and unchecked cost overruns. 
The quest to reorganize and integrate the Canadian Forces created a 
management vacuum at the DND, and it was unclear who had control of 
the project. The original estimate for the program was 142 million dollars. 
By the time it was finished, it was revealed to have cost 252 million.*1 
Although the process varied for each procurement, the outline was 
the same for major Canadian defence acquisitions. The three services of 
the Canadian military all required equipment upgrades to keep pace with 
developments in their respective areas of operations. As a result, each had 
to take their turn with respect to major purchases and competed with 
each other for scarce resources. By 1975, Pierre Trudeau's government 
launched a re-equipment program as part of the 1974-75 Defence Structure 
Review. The first major project was for the CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol 
aircraft. It had been approved in July 1976, and as Middlemiss noted, it: 
was the first to move beyond the traditional "Canadian Content" 
provisions of previous offshore defence procurement programs, 
and to stipulate in elaborate contractual language (including 
clearly specified financial penalties for non-compliance) the need 
for the foreign prime contractor (Lockheed Aircraft Corporation) 
to attempt to achieve a wide variety of economic objectives over 
the lifetime of the program." 96 
The government added to the process a funded Contract Definition Phase 
to increase competition between potential contractors and the level of 
offsets, or indirect reciprocal purchases in Canada, for the project. This 
policy invited numerous other departments into the procurement process 
to ensure that Industrial Regional Benefits (IRBs) were addressed within 
the military's large acquisition programs. This brought intergovernmental 
representatives for industry into the process. It could also include Western, 
Atlantic, and Quebec regional development agencies, and of course, the 
Finance Department had to play an integral role. 
This IRB policy was also extended to the procurement of the C-I 
Leopard main battle tank built by Krause-Maffei in West Germany. The 
project was to replace the British-built Centurion tank and was approved 
on 30 September 1976. The obvious lack of a tank industry in Canada, 
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however, combined with the relatively low cost of the project gave the 
government little leverage to negotiate with the German company. The 
contract was for 187 million dollars compared to the 697 million spent 
on the Aurora. The final offsets amounted to only 40 per cent of the 
contract price, whereas they were 96 per cent for the Aurora program. 
Moreover, Krauss-Maffei did not spread their offset purchases widely 
across Canada. Notwithstanding the comparative level of success of the 
two acquisitions, they both made explicit the Canadian government's 
desire to tie non-military economic factors to defence purchasing, and 
IRBs became inextricably tied to defence procurement. 
The new policy of IRBs directly affected the procurement of a new 
naval helicopter. The Sea King Replacement Project (SKR) was renamed 
the New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA) Project on 1 January 1981 and was re-
registered into the Defence Capital Program under that title. During the 
summer of 1985, the decision was formally made by the DND to replace 
the Sea King. On 23 May, the project was recommended for approval 
by the Program Control Board of the DND. On 10 June, it was approved 
departmentally by the Defence Management Committee, and the NSA 
Project office finally opened in August 1985. Already by this point, the 
procurement process at the DND had become unwieldy and required 
unremitting approval and analysis at many levels. This dilatory process 
continued as the SOR that was first accepted for the SKR in 1979 was 
subject to another review after the new NSA project office was opened. 
And that was only the beginning. In April of 1986, the DND authorized 
the issuance of a Solicitation of Interest (SOI) package to industry. This 
step outlined what the military was looking for in order to gauge how 
many companies might be able to fulfill the requirement. A submission 
was then made to the Treasury Board in May. In August, the Canadian 
government approved the project definition phase of the NSA.97 After 
the application of minor amendments and reformatting, the new SOR 
document was re-approved for the NSA on 1 October, and the official 
Request for Proposal (RFP) was released to ten companies on 12 November. 
It was an eleven-volume document that outlined what Canada needed in 
a maritime helicopter, and only a few of the companies were expected 
to compete. The increased complications to the procurement process 
within the DND was obvious. The stated requirements for the first naval 
helicopter procurement in 1951 were written on only a couple of pages.98 
After a need is identified, a project is approved, and an SOR written, 
a procurement strategy and an evaluation methodology must be chosen. 
The NSA is significant in that the project office had decided that the 
procurement strategy was aimed at the employment of a "Canadian 
Prime Contractor," vehicle manufacture or assembly in Canada, system 
integration in Canada, DND-funded Research and Development 
Projects, and the establishment of domestic lifetime maintenance.99 The 
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implementation phase was to consist of the development, qualification, 
and production of a fully supported helicopter by 1994. The precedent for 
the inclusion of a Canadian Prime Contractor came from the Canadian 
Patrol Frigate (CPF) Project, which had been awarded in 1983. The CPF 
Project Office did not simply want Canadian industry to participate in 
the fulfillment of the contract—it wanted a Canadian company to manage 
it.100 This policy was extended to the NSA. Clearly, the government 
wanted Canada to be thoroughly involved in the procurement of the new 
helicopter, and any foreign company that bid on the NSA had to make an 
economic partnership with domestic industry. 
In 1987, a defence white paper (Challenge and Commitment: A Defence 
Policy for Canada) was issued by the Mulroney government. It recognized 
that the influence of a nation was partly dependent on its investment 
in collective security and set out to reverse the damage done to the 
CF through budget cuts since 1971. A large part of the paper focused 
on the acquisition of new equipment. The white paper acknowledged 
that a significant "commitment-capability gap" prevented the military 
from carrying out the government's mandates.101 It acknowledged that 
decades of neglect had to be overcome, and as part of this, a new defence 
investment framework was established to link it with domestic industry. 
This continued the commitment to domestic IRBs established during the 
1970s. The paper asserted that where major equipment must be procured 
off-shore, the government would promote teaming arrangements with 
Canadian industry to foster technology transfer and the creation of 
an indigenous support base. The ADM (Mat)'s primary responsibility 
as part of this policy was to facilitate the development of industrial 
capabilities.102 The operational requirements of the military, therefore, 
were mixed within a system of competing priorities. 
Regional benefit programs have been notorious for creating 
opportunities for political patronage. One of the most infamous was the 
maintenance contract for the New Fighter Aircraft (NFA), the CF-18. The 
actual NFA contract was also a symbol of the battle for regional benefits. 
In 1978, the Manitoba government created a task force to lobby the federal 
government and the contractors involved for a 10 per cent share of the 
project's IRBs. The Manitoba lobby could not compete with Quebec's, 
however, as the latter had lost the main portion of the IRBs for the NFA 
contract to Ontario-based McDonnell Douglas. Quebec was already in the 
middle of the sovereignty-association referendum, and relations with the 
federal government were strained. As a result, the federal government 
attempted to assuage Quebec by awarding the maintenance contract 
to that province. It was awarded to Canadair on 31 October 1986. This 
decision went against the advice of the NFA project evaluation team that 
Winnipeg's Bristol Group offered a better quality bid.103 
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On 5 August 1987, Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty 
announced that the Canadian government had made a decision to 
approve funding for thirty-five helicopters designed around the EH-101. 
EH Industries, a joint British and Italian company, had been formed 
specifically to design and produce the EH-101 to replace the British and 
Italian Sea Kings, and prototypes were underway by 1987. (this would be 
note 103) The company was awarded a definition contract in April 1988 to 
begin defining how they would comply with the Canadian requirement 
of domestic technology within the electronic mission suite.104 The 
complexity of creating this new mission system in Canada and then 
installing it into the EH-101 airframe was obvious; these developments 
took years. By 1992, as hundreds of companies scrambled to be part of 
the Canadian content portion of the contract, the Program Control Board 
of the DND accepted the conclusion that the EH-101 was also the best 
helicopter for Search and Rescue (SAR), and it therefore directed that the 
NSA and the New Search and Rescue Helicopter (NSH) projects should 
be pursued as a joint venture. The contract definition phase had to begin 
again. The new proposal was not given to the government until March 
1992; it was eventually accepted in September of that year. 
Another factor that had already delayed the overall program was 
the fact that the DND did not want to be the first to procure the EH-101 
as they had already experienced problems with such an undertaking 
with the procurement of the CF-18. The NFA project continued the 
policy of linking procurement to IRBs and because Canada was to be 
the first major foreign customer of the McDonnell Douglas company, the 
government was able to negotiate a more extensive benefits package.105 
The first models received were originally calculated to have 6,000 flight 
hours available; upon delivery, however, it was discovered that their limit 
was only 2,000 hours of flying time. The first models produced were thus 
two-thirds less capable than later models. On the basis of this experience, 
DND senior officials decided that they would not enter into a contract 
for the first production run of a new weapon system again. This problem 
was solved in October 1991 when Britain's Ministry of Defence ordered 
forty-four ASW versions of the EH-101.106 
A more serious problem, however, could not be fixed. Putting the 
two projects together created one highly expensive program rather 
than two moderately expensive programs. The total project cost for the 
NSA/NSH was 4.4 billion dollars. While some considered this merely a 
semantic issue, Canada's citizenry tend to be very sensitive to defence 
expenditures, and they were preparing to go to the polls. Canada had 
entered a recession in 1989 and the Mulroney government had reneged 
on its own 1987 white paper plans to rebuild the Canadian Forces.107 By 
January 1993, Chrétien made the bold move of claiming publicly that he 
would cancel the project if elected. Chrétien knew it was far easier to 
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sell education and social programs in Canada and that he could gain 
valuable political advantage by portraying the Conservatives as wasting 
the taxpayers' hard-earned money on the tools of war in a time of 
recession and peace. In short, he knew Canadian sensibilities very well 
and how to spin expenditures on defence. He linked the acquisition of 
new helicopters to the inability of the Conservative government to solve 
the deficit problem. The Liberals claimed that the Cold War was over, 
international peace was about to return, and Canada no longer needed 
"attack helicopters" to hunt Soviet submarines. 
Although more money was expected to flow into Canada over the 
lifetime of the project through IRBs than the government was to spend 
on it, there was not a clear understanding at the DND that the most 
dangerous threat to the project was delay. The contract definition phase 
alone took five years. By the time Cabinet gave its final approval to carry 
out the NSA/NSH program in 1992, the political climate in Canada had 
changed. It had been underway for too long with too few results, just like 
the Arrow. By 1993, the existing recession and the necessity of an election 
by November turned it into a giant political target. Chrétien cancelled 
the NSA/NSH within hours of officially taking power. The total costs of 
the contract termination amounted to 478.3 million dollars.108 The lesson 
is clear: time was an important factor for the procurement of a naval 
helicopter in Canada owing to its political sensitivity. 
A. Crosby, a member of the staff of the Project Management Support 
Office within the DND in the late 1980s, later wrote that project management 
was poorly understood within the Canadian Forces and the government.109 
He cited its complexity and lack of uniformity as the primary weaknesses 
at the time; the procedural manual on project management extended into 
several volumes, and despite these guidelines, each project emerged with 
an ad hoc form. The absence of an agreed-upon framework only created 
confusion. This trend continued when the new Liberal government finally 
admitted that a replacement naval helicopter was in fact necessary the 
following year in the 1994 White Paper on Defence. 
In order to justify the cancellation of the NSA/NSH, government 
pressure was placed on senior defence officials responsible for the 
procurement to create a new SOR with a reduced capability; this is where 
the politicization of the Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP) really started. 
Rear Admiral G.L. Garnett, the commander at Maritime Command 
Headquarters, had to deal with the reality that if a new SOR was 
returned with "Cadillac"-like requirements, another replacement project 
could fail. The cost and capability, therefore, were cut in order to sell 
the project to the government. It was to be an off-the-shelf procurement 
as much as possible, which meant that it would avoid the inclusion of 
developmental or non-certified technology. The government and the 
DND had ostensibly learned that prolonging such projects put them at 
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high risk. The Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP) was then registered 
in the Defence Capital Program. The project seemed to enter stasis at 
this point, as the debate continued on the reduced SOR. In this regard, 
DND officials had only themselves to blame. They were too afraid to 
deliver a true SOR that reflected what the forces actually required. For 
over six years, the department worked on the project without seeking 
formal government direction. Their trepidation allowed the Liberals to 
successfully put the project on hold. But knowing the political climate, 
those at the DND felt they had no choice. 
The Liberals decided that it was indeed necessary for the SAR 
helicopters to also be replaced. They would be replaced first, and the SOR 
for the new Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter (CSH) was complete 
in the summer of 1995. The EH-IOl won again. It was then being called 
the Cormorant. Although the government tried to escape the decision 
through various independent assessments regarding the validity of the 
competition, they were forced to concede that the EH-101 was still the 
best aircraft or they would face a powerful legal battle with EHI. The 
political fallout over the CSH procurement served as an example of what 
had to be avoided for the MHR With the CSH, the politicians had failed 
to get involved early enough to influence the competition; after the RFP 
was too late. The key to influencing the outcome of any procurement was 
to intervene before the release of the RFP to industry. 
In its final form and after much sculpting, the procurement 
strategy for the MHP was chosen by the government in 2000. It was an 
unprecedented approach for an acquisition of that type. The Liberals had 
created a committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Herb Gray to 
assess the process.110 Once again, there would be a lack of uniformity in 
Canadian procurement and the process would evolve in an ad hoc manner. 
They chose to split the contract; one company would build the airframe 
and another, the mission systems and avionics inside. The project office 
then had to lay out two sets of requirements. The government refused to 
explain its rationale for choosing this strategy and ignored the advice of 
both the DND and the Department of Public Works. This political decision 
increased the risk of massive delays and cost overruns owing to the 
modifications that would be needed to incorporate the electronics inside 
the airframe and then recertify the aircraft. It also effectively precluded 
any possible savings through EHI (which by that time was being called 
AgustaWestland [AW]) derived from the commonality of aircraft that 
Canada already used for SAR, specifically with respect to life cycle costs. 
The split procurement allowed more companies to compete, which would 
make it easier to avoid choosing AW. The EH-101 variant had always been 
the strongest competitor in attempts to replace the Sea King. 
The Liberals also realized that if they cast aside the "best value" 
methodology used in the CSH project, it would be easier to avoid going with 
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the EH-101 model; it was more capable, but it was also more expensive than 
its competitors. A "lowest-cost-compliant" matrix was then implemented, 
which essentially stated that if one company's bid was a dollar less than 
the others, as long as it was deemed compliant, then it would be chosen, 
regardless of overall quality and value. This contradicted the Treasury 
Board Contracting Policy. The procurement strategy also extended the 
timeline for delivery from 2005 to 2008. The mistake of using the split 
procurement strategy was later admitted; midway through the process, it 
was changed back to a single contract for the sake of efficiency. This, of 
course, delayed the procurement even further. Almost a hundred million 
dollars was spent to keep the Sea Kings in the air in the interim; however, 
no amount of money could make them competent in modern operations. 
The government directed the procurement to award the contract to the 
company that fulfilled the minimum requirements with the lowest price. 
Military officials at the DND went along with that political direction 
because they knew it was the only way to get helicopters. The problem was 
that there was no actual accountability placed on the companies to prove 
that they could fulfill these requirements—specifically the ability to deliver 
on time. The original pre-qualification process as stated by the DND had 
been specifically constructed to eliminate bidders that could not deliver 
their product on schedule.111 After all, the whole idea from the beginning 
of the procurement was to avoid a developmental aircraft and purchase off-
the-shelf. This was amended after it became clear that one of the bidders, 
Sikorsky, did not have an existing helicopter. As part of the pre-qualification 
phase, the process then permitted bidders to promise that, to the extent 
their aircraft did not exist, they would develop it for Canada.112 
On 23 November 2004, Sikorsky was awarded a 4 billion dollar 
contract for the acquisition of twenty-eight fully integrated, certified, 
and qualified helicopters with mission systems installed and a twenty-
year period of in-service support.113 Delivery of the first helicopter was 
required to be no later than 30 November 2008. It had also been decided 
that the penalty for late delivery would be capped at 36.5 million dollars, 
regardless of how long the helicopters were delayed. The government was 
subsequently sued for over 1 billion dollars in damages by AW. They had 
always claimed the Sikorsky could never deliver their aircraft on time, 
asserting that the government chose Sikorsky despite its non-compliance 
because the Cormorant was not a politically acceptable aircraft.114 On 10 
January 2008, the Canadian media discovered that the military staff at 12 
Wing in Shearwater had been told by Sikorsky that the first new helicopter 
would not arrive until 2010 or 2011. The helicopters were not ready; they 
were not even certified. It was a developmental aircraft and the DND and 
Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) knew this at 
the time the contract was awarded to Sikorsky. Any military equipment 
project over 100 million dollars is required to go through PWGSC after 
approval from Cabinet and the Treasury Board. The reality may be that 
the government had decided to take deliveries beyond 2008 from the 
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beginning. It is clear that the Cyclone could never have been delivered 
within the RFP timeline. They are not even close. Nobody knows when 
the helicopters will be delivered. It was reported in April 2008 that 
Sikorsky had asked for up to 500 million dollars in new funding and that 
the government threatened to cancel the entire contract."3 
Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier gave a speech at the 
historic Pier 21 in the Halifax Harbour the day the delay became public. 
He said he was frustrated by the delay and that Canada needed to shed 
its reputation of being "world-class at maintaining old equipment." 116 It 
is still undecided if any penalties will be assessed for breach of contract. 
The replacement of the Sea King has been the longest running equipment 
procurement project in Canadian history. It is the worst case of procurement 
incompetence on the part of both the government and the DND and 
highlights every weakness of defence acquisition in this country. 
******* 
The semantics of "political interference" in Canadian procurement has 
recently been challenged. In 2006 Former ADM (Mat) Alan Williams 
wrote that 
The behavioural implications for ministers are quite clear. Since 
they can no longer interfere in the procurement process once 
it has started, their only opportunity to do so comes prior to 
its formal commencement ... It must be emphasized that there 
is nothing wrong with ministerial involvement prior to the 
beginning of the process.117 
The logic holds that, in the Canadian system, it is not considered 
"interference" for politicians who are ultimately responsible for the 
operation of the DND and the PWGSC to express a preference for 
one evaluation methodology over another. Williams goes on to say, 
however, that "the problem is when ministers try to distort the form 
the procurement process will take for political purposes." So whether 
one calls it interference or not, the MHP procurement strategy that had 
been given to the DND by the government before the RFP was issued 
falls within the "problem" he outlined in the last sentence. Ministers were 
distorting the process for political purposes. The strategy that was chosen 
was completely unconventional and against common business practice. 
Williams correctly explained that "at times they [members of cabinet] have 
delayed the process by interfering with the marketplace in an attempt to 
influence the list of respondents to a request for proposals." Again, this was 
done with the MHR Politicians ignored the advice of military professionals 
and tendering agents in order to influence the outcome of a procurement. 
This may not be called interference according to Mr. Williams if it comes 
before the RFP, but as it was in the case of the MHP, it certainly creates the 
potential for the competition to be biased and unethical. 
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Williams did provide a good example of what he felt was political 
interference—the attempts to replace the ageing ILTIS utility vehicle for 
the Canadian army He wrote that 
In an effort to reduce cost and risk, the vehicles had to be "non-
developmental," meaning already in use by another army so 
it could be bought for a predictable cost off-the-shelf. And the 
army was supposed to receive its new vehicles by 1999. So far, 
so good. Unfortunately, politics then began to interfere. Instead 
of sticking to this strategy, Minister of Defence Art Eggleton 
was persuaded by officials from a British Columbia firm called 
Western Star to distort the process. Western Star had previously 
provided the military with a truck, the Light Support Vehicle 
Wheeled, and was now offering a new truck they had just built. 
In February 1999, 16 months after Treasury Board approved the 
procurement strategy but before the process had formally started, 
the strategy was changed to allow "developmental vehicles" into 
the competition. Sixteen months of unnecessary delays. The irony 
or perhaps tragedy in this case was that Freightliner, the owners 
of Western Star, announced in 2001 that Western Star would not 
bid on the LUVW [Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled] contract but 
would instead be closed down. 
More than three years after the Treasury Board approved the initial 
procurement strategy, contracts were finally signed in October 2002 for 
General Motors Militarized Commercial Off-the-Shelf (MilCOTS), which 
are based on the Silverado, and deliveries were scheduled for October 
2003 to August 2004. A contract was also issued in October 2003 for 
the Mercedes Benz GWagon with deliveries scheduled between March 
2004 and August 2005. The author continued: "Five years needlessly lost 
due to political interference. And for most of that time Canadian troops 
were deployed in the Afghan combat zone with vehicles known to be 
inadequately protected." 118 This is exactly what happened with the MHP 
regarding the political choice of including "developmental vehicles." 
In Canada, as in most liberal democratic states, civil control of the 
military has meant the control of the armed forces by civilians elected to 
Parliament acting in accordance with statutes passed by that legislative 
body.1'9 Civilian control is intended to ensure that the decisions affecting 
the defence of a nation and the use of the armed forces are taken by 
politicians that are responsible to the people—not professional soldiers. 
It could also be argued, however, that the politicians have a responsibility 
to use the information that they are given by military experts, despite 
their possible bias, to make informed decisions. But they are under no 
obligation to do so. As one author put it, "civil control of the military 
is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for 
control between civilian leaders and military officers." 120 Each side, 
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therefore, agrees to assume certain responsibilities and accountabilities 
within a formalized regime of understandings. This regime should, 
theoretically, allow each a measure of independence, but the civilian 
authority ultimately reserves the right to make the final decisions. 
******* 
The way procurement is currently being handled has also incurred 
a great deal of criticism. It is actually quite similar to the MHR The 
sculpting of the procurement before the RFP is still essential. As the 
accusations go, the SOR and the RFP are drafted in such a way that there 
can only be one company that could deliver the requirements. Much like 
the Bren Gun purchase in 1938, one company is determined to be able 
to provide a necessary capability to the military without a competition 
for contract. It is more complicated today, however, as other companies 
are theoretically given a chance to compete. An Advanced Contract 
Award Notice is posted on MERX, the government's electronic tendering 
service, to make clear what the DND requires and that it intends to 
award a sole-source contract to a particular company. Other possible 
competitors, therefore, are given a small window, usually fifteen days, to 
prove that they can also deliver on those requirements. But the military 
is usually aware that only one company can comply with the parameters 
set out in the requirement specifications, thus no other company is able 
to submit a compliant bid. The winner of the contract is predetermined, 
and competition is bypassed based on urgent need. Canada is actually 
unique among its western allies in requiring, through the Agreement 
on Internal Trade (AIT), that military equipment be acquired through 
a competitive process. Article 506.11, however, states that if urgency is 
clear then competition can be circumvented.121 And much like the Bren 
Gun contract, there is the assertion that this goes against common and 
fair business practice. The criticism is also that the firms chosen are 
often American and that Canadian industry is not given a fair chance to 
compete.122 The advantage to this strategy, however, is that the SOR does 
not take six years to write, another four to sign a contract, and another 
seven to deliver the product, as was the case wth the MHP By 2001, 
the procurement process was estimated to take approximately fifteen 
years,123 but on the modern battlefield, a new technology can be outdated 
within five. If it takes over a decade to procure a weapons platform, it 
will likely be obsolete by the time it is delivered. With a sole-source 
procurement, the timeline is considerably shorter. A company's ability 
to deliver equipment quickly to fulfil the CF's needs is key to them being 
selected. Operational urgency necessitates off-the-shelf purchases of 
existing models that avoid any developmental technology. 
In the summer of 2006, the Conservative government led by 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper promised funding of 15 billion dollars 
for equipment procurement, including ships, trucks, helicopters, and 
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transport aircraft. The fact that Canada was at war and was in serious 
need of new hardware for the Afghanistan mission was used to justify the 
new investment. Although this was a bold and encouraging move from 
the point of military capability, it was another example of how Canada 
prepares for war after it has already begun. When Canadian soldiers first 
arrived in the field they were drastically under-prepared. This was best 
illustrated by the issue of green (woodland) camouflage uniforms for a 
desert campaign. These embarrassments created sympathy for the CF 
and slowly changed public sentiment towards military spending. The 
DND, in co-operation with the government, began to try to reverse the 
damage done by the budget cuts and lack of defence purchasing during 
the 1990s. This reversal actually began with Chretien's successor and the 
Liberal government of Paul Martin, which authorized what were being 
called Immediate Operational Requirements and created a new strategy 
for defence acquisitions demanding quick delivery. 
One of the first examples of accelerated procurement was for 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) used for aerial surveillance and 
reconnaissance. The SPERWER drones acquired from Quebec-based 
Oerlikon-Contraves were sent to Afghanistan in 2003 under accelerated 
procurement processes within clause 506.11(a).124 Another example was 
the acquisition of the M777 155mm gun for the Canadian artillery, which 
was purchased in November 2005 and sent to Afghanistan so quickly 
that is was there before most analysts had heard of the project. In 2008 
the PWGSC posted a notice on MERX for an additional thirty-four pieces 
from industry, but it is speculated that the requirements were written 
specifically with the M777 from BAE in mind and that it was unlikely 
that any other company would compete.125 This procurement is symbolic 
of the debate on sole sourcing. Although it is possible that a rigorous 
competition may save the government—and Canadian taxpayers—money, 
it may also prolong the acquisition of necessary equipment needed by the 
CF immediately. And most often, open competitions have only resulted 
in massive cost overruns and a lack of actual capability. Our history 
proves they do not necessarily save money. The M777 is a highly effective 
artillery piece and has received nothing but positive reviews from our 
soldiers.126 It also makes little sense to operate two different models in the 
field and there is no evidence that another gun of equal quality could be 
acquired as quickly and/or for less. 
The more recent acquisition of the C-17 Globemaster for Strategic 
Airlift is another example of how sole source procurement can eliminate 
one of the largest weaknesses of the Canadian procurement system-
delayed acquisitions. Canada has never had this capability, and getting 
supplies and troops to the Canadian battle group in Afghanistan's 
interior had caused incessant logistical difficulties. These aircraft would 
also be vital for rapid reaction to domestic emergencies, such as a west-
coast earthquake. The outcome of the process used to purchase the C-17 
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from Boeing was predetermined; only their Globemaster model could 
fulfill the set requirements. The issue with this sole source acquisition 
is that the Airbus consortium claimed it could supply the same number 
of planes for considerably less. The government, therefore, is seen as 
wasting tax dollars to buy the plane that they want. What is not fully 
understood by the public, however, is that the Airbus A400M model is still 
on the drawing board and is not a certified aircraft. Just like the Cyclone, 
nobody has any idea when it will be ready. And as we have seen with the 
MHP, this is not how the government should acquire equipment when the 
need is immediate. Part of the requirement specification for the strategic 
airlift, therefore, was a rapid delivery schedule and this factor excluded 
Airbus in favour of Boeing. The contract, including maintenance, was 
for 3.4 billion dollars. This was a wise decision; the C17s have already 
been delivered.127 In April 2008, Canada took delivery of the fourth and 
final C-17 only fourteen months after it was ordered. Based on previous 
Canadian procurement history, this is a stunning success. 
The same process was used to procure replacements for the 
forty-year-old C-130 Hercules Tactical Airlift with the new C-130J. The 
accelerated delivery requirement was the same. Lockheed Martin, which 
built the original Hercules fleet, was the only competitor who could 
replace the obsolete aircraft quickly. By allowing the CF to enter into a 
rust-out phase in the 1990s, the luxury of slow acquisitions based on years 
of competition and price haggling is no longer an option. Any neglect of 
the CF by a government in power, therefore, only increases the costs to 
taxpayers later. The contract for seventeen aircraft, valued at 1.4 billion 
dollars, was awarded on 20 December 2007. The first aircraft is to be 
delivered within three years.128 While leasing or purchasing used Russian 
aircraft was always an option, the Canadian public had already been 
made aware of the problems with this type of acquisition. The Canadian 
government bought four 1980s-era mothballed submarines from the 
British in 1998 for 891 million dollars. On its first voyage to Canada, there 
was a fire aboard the HMCS Chicoutimi that killed a crew member and 
crippled the sub. The subs were all in a deteriorated condition and, ten 
years after they were purchased, they have never been fully operational. 
This goes back to the theme of Canada being forced to consistently waste 
time and money on maintaining obsolete equipment. This is also why it 
was announced within the Conservative equipment plan to purchase up 
to 2,300 new, medium-sized logistics trucks for the army.129 At the time of 
the announcement, the DND had spent up to 80,000 dollars per vehicle to 
keep the twenty-five-year-old trucks on the road. 
The procurement of new trucks is also a good example of how IRB 
programs are developing. The target value of the IRB is equivalent to 
100 per cent of the contract value for the capital acquisition, which will 
be approximately 1.1 billion dollars.130 The chosen company will have to 
offset the purchase by investing the equivalent of the contract cost into 
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Canadian industry. In fact, the entire 2006 equipment announcement 
was being promoted as a national job creation scheme. The completed 
C-17 procurement had the same IRB policy, and it has been successful. As 
long as the government does not ask Canadian industry to experiment 
and develop a portion of the aircraft, this style of IRB is low risk and 
usually does not delay the acquisition. Maintenance contracts offer the 
lowest risk and make the most strategic sense. The government may buy 
a piece of equipment from a foreign source, but they can establish the 
means to maintain it domestically over its lifetime. This creates long-
term industrial development and jobs for Canadians without posing a 
risk to the delivery of the military capability. 
Not all of the sole-source contracts have been successful. In June 
2006, it was announced that the CF required "medium to heavy" lift 
helicopters. The dangers of moving troops overland in Afghanistan 
include exposure to ambushes and suicide bombers, as well as 
Improvised Explosive Devices. This lack of tactical transport helicopters 
is consistent with Canadian procurement history, as the government 
had sold this exact capability—seven CH-147 Chinooks—to the Dutch in 
1991. The CF now has to borrow transport helicopters from the United 
States to reach the front lines. As Canadian military historian Desmond 
Morton once exclaimed: "Our capacity to prophesy what we'll need our 
defence forces for, when, why, and how, had proven so far to be zip." 131 
And so the government set out to reacquire transport helicopters. No 
other model complied with the DND's requirements, and so the contract 
went to Boeing for sixteen new Chinooks. The Liberals claimed that there 
was no competition simply to please the Americans and that because 
it was an American firm, Canada may not have control of the aircraft 
after delivery.132 Both assertions were ridiculous. Notwithstanding the 
typical criticism, it was expected that it would be another streamlined 
procurement, with Chinooks entering Afghanistan relatively quickly. 
This has not been the case. The report on Canada's role in Afghanistan 
headed by John Manley that was released in January 2008 highlighted 
the delayed acquisition by stating that their entry into the field should 
be considered necessary for any extension of the mission beyond 2009. 
This created a panic at the DND on how they were going to comply 
with this recommendation. Although Harper claimed that the Chinooks 
were already "on order," there was still no contract signed with Boeing, 
and the aircraft were not expected until 2011—years after the extended 
mission will have ended.133 It was a classic example of how there is no 
synergy between policy and procurement in Canada. The RFP has been 
released but there has yet been no answer from Boeing. The current 
estimate remains at 4.7 billion dollars, including maintenance, but 
nobody really knows what the final cost will be or if the CF will get them 
before 2011. Although delays in delivery are often caused by untested 
prototypes or IRB contracts, timelines are still contingent on how fast 
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the company can manufacture them and how many clients are ahead of 
the Canadian government. As it stands, it has been rumoured that the 
United States militarv is preparing six additional older Chinooks for the 
CF to use as a temporary measure starting in the fall of 2008. The Manley 
Report also recommended the procurement of more UAVs to conduct 
surveillance by February 2009, and a lease of the drones was expected 
under an accelerated timetable sometime in the summer. Instead of the 
more common six years, they were expected within six months from 
the time the contract was awarded. In May 2008, however, the company 
expected to supply the Predator drones, General Atomic, wrote a letter to 
the government and explained that such a rapid schedule was impossible 
and that it exposed the company to an unacceptable level of risk.134 They 
revealed they would not be bidding on the contract. Once again, just 
because a government finally realizes that it needs to acquire equipment 
quickly in order for the military to carry out its orders, there are limits to 
how fast industry can deliver on highly technical products. 
Not all current procurements are being sole sourced. There was 
a competition for the Joint Support Ship (JSS), which is set to replace 
the two current refuelling and resupply vessels that have become very 
expensive to maintain, as they were first launched in 1968 and 1970. 
The new ships will be built in Canada in an attempt to revitalize the 
domestic shipbuilding industry. On 24 November 2006, the government 
announced contracts for the Project Definition phase, which included two 
teams -ThyssenKrupp and SNC-Lavalin-who will receive contracts for 
12.5 million dollars to complete proposals to design and build the ships. 
The contract is set at 2.9 billion dollars for three ships to be delivered in 
2012. This design definition phase is what they did with the NSA project, 
and although Canada does have experience building capable naval 
vessels, it has been quite some time since it has done so. Delays should 
definitely be expected due to the developmental nature of designing a 
sophisticated, modern ship for the navy. Once again, our history with 
such ambitious design projects gives cause for concern regarding delays 
and cost overruns. As with the original St. Laurent project, the cancelled 
General Purpose Frigate, and the 280 Class, the ship that is described in 
the specifications is different than any other existing ship design. There 
are also other replenishment ships available on the market.135 After the 
Definition Phase competition, then there is still the Implementation Phase 
discussions that must be carried out with the government and finally, the 
completion of myriad subcontractor negotiations. The first test will be 
whether the prime contractor is selected as scheduled sometime in 2008. 
If this is delayed, the entire project will likely follow suit and meet the 
same fate as the other Canadian-designed ships. 
A less complicated procurement to replace the Heavy Logistics 
Vehicle Wheeled also included competition, but by avoiding developmental 
research and technology, ithas created a model for accelerated procurement. 
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According to the Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-08, after the need was 
identified, a Request for Price and Availability was released to industry in 
August 2006, where four potential bidders were identified.136 The SOI was 
released to industry that October. The RFP was completed by January 
2007 and a contract signed a month later with Mercedes. The contract was 
to achieve Full Operational Capability a year later. Indeed, the eighty-two 
trucks were shipped directly from the plant in Germany to Afghanistan 
and are currently operating to great effect in theatre. The contract also 
follows the IRB policy of 100 per cent of the 87 million dollars contract 
value being invested in Canada by the winner. 
Another possible success story for the future could be the replacement 
of Canada's fleet of wheeled Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs). The LAV 
Ills were one of the few major procurements made throughout the 1990s, 
and they are the backbone of the army's combat fleet. They are made 
in Canada by the American branch plant of General Dynamics Land 
Systems (formerly GM Defence) in London, Ontario, and in Edmonton, 
Alberta. Although 651 was the total number of vehicles to be procured, 
the government decided to purchase them in smaller batches to make the 
final total expenditure seem smaller to the Canadian public in an effort 
to avoid a repeat of the NSA/NSH experience.137 Although there are new 
American options under development that could offer a replacement for 
the fleet of vehicles, General Hillier has stated that he wishes to continue 
the purchase of off-the-shelf items that can be delivered quickly.138 General 
Dynamics does have a new model—the LAV-H-in development for just 
such a project and the DND would be wise to explore it as the primary 
option as it could be integrated easily into the current fleet. Since the IRB 
aspect is also already in place, this mitigates the risk to any approved 
project timetable. 
Although there has been a great deal of progress in getting the CF 
the equipment it needs to carry out government objectives, there is still 
cause for concern. In early 2008, all three services chiefs announced in 
their strategic assessments that they were still in need of major equipment 
revitalization.139 The announcement revolved around the necessity of 
acquiring spare parts, funding repair work, infrastructure, and allotting 
money to the most basic of needs—fuel. Although new equipment is on 
its way, the chiefs assert that there is no money left over to operate the 
equipment that they have. They conclude that planes will be grounded, 
ships will be docked, and vehicles will remain unserviceable. And there 
are still items that need to be replaced. One of the major reasons that 
the military does not seem able to catch up is that massive investment 
is going to the mission in Afghanistan. This upsets the balance between 
investment in operations and in capital spending. And DND officials 
have been known to exaggerate; part of their job is to lobby for money. 
But there is clearly a need for more investment. Although the replacement 
of Canadian Fixed Wing Search and Rescue planes was considered a top 
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priority in 2003, the CF have been asked to keep them flying until at least 
2014,140 though they were scheduled to be retired in 2010. The existing 
Buffalo aircraft are forty years old, and it will cost approximately 75 
million dollars to keep them in the air. In some areas, therefore, the CF 
will have to continue its reputation for maintaining obsolete equipment. 
The purchase of used equipment due to limited resources has also 
created problems. In addition to the Canadian submarine problem, the 
government has also had problems with its more recent procurement 
of heavy armour for Afghanistan. In December 2008, the government 
agreed to purchase 100 used Leopard 2s from the Dutch as part of a 1.3 
billion dollar tank program to replace Canada's existing, thirty-year-old 
Leopard I models. But as with the submarines, the tanks were in long-term 
storage, and they must first undergo upgrades before they enter the field. 
Since Canadian industry lost the ability to overhaul tanks because of the 
defence cuts in the 1990s, there was no company ready to undertake the 
work.141 The tanks, much like the Chinooks, may not become operational 
until after the Afghanistan mission is over. 
Another problem for the CF is that there has always been a lack of 
an overall, long-term procurement strategy. The DND no longer relies on 
the annual Strategic Capability Investment Plan, and the Report on Plans 
and Priorities remains the best source for information about the general 
shopping list of the CF. It provides an outline of where a project is and 
a future timetable. But it does not prioritize between projects, and many 
of those included are no longer on schedule or within budget. As we 
concluded in the Opaque Window report, most of the major procurement 
projects no longer resemble the original plan.142 The MHP is not even 
close, and the Mobile Gun System, which has been discussed since 2003, 
is still included in the report.143 Approximately 17 million dollars has been 
spent on the project but the obvious intent is to close it out completely, 
given that the CF reversed its decision to retire heavy armour capability 
and is buying new tanks. 
This absence of long-term procurement planning is symptomatic 
of the lack of highly trained personnel within the department who have 
overseen multiple projects over a long period of time. Most often, ad hoc 
project offices are created and once the project is over, the members of 
the team scatter to other posts. There is, quite simply, a lack of expertise 
in an area that is vitally important to the CF There is also a lack of 
accountability within the departments involved in the process. When 
Alan Williams appeared as a citizen before the Standing Committee on 
Defence in 2007, he explained: "If you wanted to bring a minister here to 
be held accountable for defence acquisition, you could not do that." 144 But 
Williams' book does offer a solution. Of his twenty-five recommendations 
on how to improve the process, his main conclusion is to have a single 
agency responsible for Canadian defence procurement. He calls it 
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"Defence Procurement Canada," which would be under the authority of 
the Minister of National Defence.145 He is absolutely right. In fact, this 
same recommendation was made within The Management of Defence in 
Canada in July 1972. Although this created the ADM (Mat) position in 
the first place, the expansion of departments and committees involved 
in Canadian defence procurement sustained a lack of accountability.146 
Although defence contracts are far more expensive, technical, and 
complex than are other government purchasing contracts, there is no 
specialized agency to effectively carry out these projects. This would also 
remove the functional overlap between the DND and the PWGSC.147 
If Defence Procurement Canada—or some derivative of it—is 
eventually formed, the real need would be to focus on procurement-
specific training and on retention of the people with these skills. It must 
be a professional organization with a memory; the history of Canadian 
defence procurement is vital to understanding the pitfalls of our past in 
order to avoid the mistakes that have characterized it. And since there 
will never be enough money available to fully equip all aspects of the CF, 
Canadian procurement must be as efficient as possible. Part of the training 
and retention of talented and experienced procurement officials would also 
solve the ongoing problem of weak project management of major defence 
acquisitions. The DND's financial oversight committee, the Chief of Review 
Services, recommended in April 2007 that twenty-five capital equipment 
projects totalling 7.3 billion dollars required further investigation owing to 
various types of cost overruns, project mismanagement, and an inability 
to stay on schedule. The specifics of which projects and companies were 
targeted has not been released. In fact, under the new system there is 
very little information available to the public regarding acquisitions 
under development. Although the government and the DND are getting 
equipment into the field, there is a lack of transparency regarding how 
and when. In this case, the specifics of poor project management are also 
being withheld. As of 2007, media questions about procurement are no 
longer handled by CF public affairs officers. Any information must first 
be approved by the Prime Minister's Office or the Privy Council Office. 
It has been referred to as the Harper "gag order," and answers related to 
defence acquisitions are rarely readily available.148 Companies interested in 
bidding on equipment contracts are even prevented from talking publicly 
about any possible projects. This secrecy only results in public confusion 
and an inability of Canadian citizens to judge responsibility with respect 
to such a large portion of government spending.149 
********** 
For the majority of its history, Canadian governments have been incapable 
or unwilling to properly equip its military. When it has tried, the motives 
have usually been driven by non-military considerations. From the 
beginning of our history, politicians have endorsed projects that took too 
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long and cost too much only to have to start all over again once they were 
complete. The government supported the use of the Ross Rifle because 
it was made in Canada long after it had been proven flawed. The Bren 
Gun affair of 1938 also demonstrated how getting a weapon into service 
quickly was less important than the need to have as many companies as 
possible compete for the contract. Procurements during the 1970s and 
1980s were turned into regional benefit schemes that, as in the case of 
the NSA Sea King replacement, dragged the acquisitions out so long that 
they became vulnerable to outright cancellation. The lessons of the St. 
Laurent class ships, the Bobcat APC, the General Purpose Frigate, or the 
infamous Avro Arrow were not learned. And from the way that the Joint 
Support Ship project is currently progressing, this ahistorical behaviour 
is primed and ready to continue. It would seem that those at the DND 
have little understanding of our most common procurement failures or 
why they happened in the first place. The decision to select the H-92 from 
Sikorsky to replace the Sea Kings is another daunting example. Those 
responsible for procurement should have known that there was a high 
risk attached to accepting the first production run of an untested and 
uncertified aircraft; the CF-18 purchase experience made this clear. This 
should also have been learned directly from the NSA project itself, but 
this lesson was lost by 2004; the memory was gone. Each procurement 
project office has been assembled and conducted in a vacuum; they have 
made little use of the experiences of those who came before them. This is 
not truly the fault of the DND, as politics reigns in defence procurement 
and lessons are often cast aside in the name of protecting the reputation 
of the government or to achieve regional benefits. It is not about project 
efficiency, saving money, or how the acquisition is meant to help the 
CF. Much of how the military behaves regarding these acquisitions is 
dictated to them by the civil power, and they are forced to comply with 
government purchasing strategies that are completely illogical from the 
perspective of military capability. Even the writing of the SOR, which 
should be a straightforward document about what the military needs, is 
often sculpted to reflect the political realities of the day. The alternative is 
to have the government ignore the requirement completely. 
This trend of the neglect of defence acquisitions was particularly 
acute during the 1990s, as successive Canadian governments neglected 
to maintain the equipment standards necessary for an effective national 
defence force. The end of the Cold War did not bring world peace or a 
decrease in the CF's operational tempo. In fact, the opposite occurred. 
This created the oft-cited commitment/capability gap as equipment stores 
were pushed to the limit of their operational effectiveness. The Harper 
government set out to narrow this gap, but because the rustout is so 
severe, the priority has become getting the equipment the CF needs into 
the field rapidly—not simply to create regional benefits to industry. This 
means that the current government may at times have to pay a premium 
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to accelerate procurement timelines. The purchases are often off-the-shelf 
from companies that guarantee delivery schedules. There is usually only 
one product that best fulfills a requirement. In such cases where the need 
is immediate, extensive competitions should be avoided. Anything that 
drags out a procurement in Canada will hurt the chances of the military 
getting what they need to do their job. The focus should be on equipping 
the CF to avoid international embarrassments and the endangerment of our 
soldiers' lives. There are many nations that are more interested in matters 
of defence that make more advanced and effective military hardware. 
More secure investment and a larger defence industry in countries like 
the United States have ensured that they can produce equipment faster 
and for less. This was most obvious with the Sherman tank and the F-86 
fighter; the Canadian Ram and the CF-100 could not compete and were cast 
aside as a result. When the Canadian Forces have an immediate need for 
equipment, as they so often do, the smart play is to purchase tested models 
from countries like the United States. The lack of prior investment in the 
CF means that Canada has lost the luxury of time to research, develop, 
and produce its own equipment on a broad scale. National IRB programs 
are fine as long as they do not include an extensive Definition Phase, 
which usually makes a mockery of any established delivery timetable. 
The current use of Canadian industry to maintain foreign purchases over 
their service lifetime and the demand for the winning company to invest 
a comparable amount of the contract into Canadian industry are ways to 
lessen the risk of these regional programs. 
After the equipment investment announcement in 2006, J.L. 
Granatstein correctly noted that "within five years, the military will be 
able to respond better to domestic and international crises than at any time 
in the last half-century." 150 There have been annual increases in funding, 
and the government is clearly committed to having a capable military. 
They have also proven that they have learned some of the lessons as to 
why it has been taking fifteen years to get equipment into the field, and 
more importantly, why this paralyzes military capability. The procurement 
of the C-17 is a success story: the CF needed a capability, they found a 
company that could deliver, the government bought it, and the company 
delivered the product. This example, along with the others cited, are reason 
for optimism despite that fact that there will still be equipment that comes 
online long after it was needed. Hopefully there are people at the DND 
taking stock of these successes and failures who will still be involved in 
the process when the time comes to create another project office. 
EPILOGUE 
On 12 May 2008, the day that this manuscript was to be submitted for 
review, the Harper government finally announced its Canada First Defence 
Strategy and how equipment procurement would be affected. Harper 
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described it in his speech as a long-term investment plan that could 
include an increase in funding to the military of 30 billion dollars over 
the next twenty years. Part of the focus is to distribute economic benefits 
across the country and create jobs in the defence industry. The idea of 
designing and building in Canada is not new, of course, and it will mean 
that things take longer and cost more, at least at first. But there is a vision. 
The plan is not only looking at what is needed now, such as Search and 
Rescue planes; it also considers other projects, including the replacement 
of the RCN's destroyer and frigate fleets, fighter aircraft, maritime patrol 
aircraft, and land combat vehicles that will end their operational life 
over the next twenty years. It has identified six specific, core equipment 
fleets and it is a guideline aimed at their replacement.1 D] If the Canadian 
defence industry is able to anticipate future requirements far enough in 
advance with secure funding, perhaps it will be able to supply much of 
what the CF needs to carry out the government's mandate for the first 
time. But this has been promised before. The focus on rebuilding the CF 
and using domestic industry to do so was exactly what was declared in 
the 1987 white paper. A recession quickly made the document politically 
impossible. In the case of Canada First, there is not even a document, 
despite the fact that one was promised two years ago. How it will be 
carried out is unclear, and the list of things that need replacing has 
still not been prioritized. Although the idea of established, long-term 
funding for equipment is a wise one, it can be overturned by any future 
government. It is far too early to judge whether Canada First will improve 
how Canada purchases equipment or if our procurement history will 
continue on the repeat cycle. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AgustaWestland (AW) 
Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) 
Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) 
Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiel (ADM [Mat]) 
A.V. Roe (Avrò) 
Canadian Army Research and Development Establishment (CARDE) 
Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) 
Canadian Search and Rescue Helicopter (CSH) 
Defence Purchasing Board (DPB) 
Department of Defence Production (DDP) 
Department of National Defence (DND) 
Department of Supply and Services (DSS) 
Industrial Regional Benefits (IRBs) 
Joint Support Ship (JSS) 
Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) 
38 
AARON PLAMONDON 
Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP) 
Militarized Commercial Off-the-Shelf (MilCOTS) 
Military Co-operation Committee (MCC) 
National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) 
New Fighter Aircraft (NFA) 
New Search and Rescue Helicopter (NSH) 
New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA) 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) 
Request for Proposal (RFP) 
Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) 
Sea King Replacement Project (SKR) 
Search and Rescue (SAR) 
Solicitation of Interest (SOI) 
Statement of Requirement (SOR) 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
United States (US) 
NOTES 
1. Desmond Morton, Understanding Canadian Defence (Toronto: Penguin 
Canada, 2003), 82. 
2. This study is based in part on my thesis, Casting off the Yoke: The Transition 
of Canadian Defence Procurewent Within the North Atlantic Triangle, 1907-53 
(unpublished Master's thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 2001) and 
on my doctoral dissertation, The Politics of Procurement: Weapons Acquisition 
in Canada and the Sea King Helicopter (University of Calgary, 2006); the 
latter has been accepted for future publication by the University of British 
Columbia Press. 
3. David Bercuson, "Time to Wake Up on Procurement," Legion Magazine 
(Nov.-Dec, 2005). 
4. See Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics in the Canadian Militia, 
1868-1904 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); Stephen Harris, 
Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1988); Richard Preston, Canada and "Imperial 
Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense 
Organization, 1867-1919 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967); Donald C 
Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965). 
5. CP Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada: A Survey of Defence Policies 
and Strategic Conditions Past and Present (Toronto: Ryerson Press/Canadian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1940). 
6. See R.G. Haycock, "Early Canadian Weapons Acquisition: 'That Damned 
Ross Rifle'." Canadian Defence Quarterly (Winter 1984-85); David Carnegie, 
The History of Munitions Supply in Canada 1914-1918 (Toronto: Longmans, 
1925); R.G. Haycock, "Policy, Patronage, and Production: Canada's Public 
and Private Munitions Industry in Peacetime, 1867-1939," in Canada's 
39 
EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT IN CANADA 
Defence Industrial Base: The Political Economy of Preparedness and Procurement, 
ed. D.G. Haglund (Kingston: R.P. Frye, 1988); Roger F. Phillips, The Ross Rifle 
Story (Sydney, NS: J.A. Chadwick, 1984); A. Fortescue Duguid, A Question of 
Confidence: The Ross Rifle in the Trenches (Ottawa: Service Publications, 2000); 
Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 
1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). 
7. For example, see J.L. Granatstein, Arming the Nation: Canada's Industrial War 
Effort, 1939-45, Paper prepared for the Council of Chief Executives (Ottawa: 
2005); see also Michael Hennessy, "The Industrial Front: The Scale and 
Scope of Canadian Industrial Mobilization During the Second World War," 
in Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience, ed. B. 
Horn (St. Catharines: Vanwell, 2002), 135-54; J. Kirton, "The Consequences 
of Integration: The Case of the Defence Production Sharing Agreements," 
in Continental Community? Independence and Integration in North America, ed. 
W. A. Axline (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974), 116-36; D.W. Middlemiss, 
A Pattern of Cooperation: The Case of the Canadian-American Defence Production 
and Development Sharing Arrangements, 1958-1963 (unpublished Ph.D. diss., 
University of Toronto, 1975); William J. Yost, Industrial Mobilization in Canada, 
Paper prepared for the Conference of Defence Associations (Ottawa, 1983); 
and D.W. Middlemiss, "Canada and Defence Industrial Preparedness: A 
Return To Basics," in Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman Ltd., 
1993). Among the many books on the Arrow, see Grieg Stewart, Shutting 
Down the National Dream: A.V. Roe and the Tragedy of the Avro Arrow (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill/Ryerson, 1988). 
8. D.W. Middlemiss, "Defence Procurement in Canada," in Canada's International 
Security Policy, ed. D.B. Dewitt and D. Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice 
Hall, 1995), 391. 
9. William Johnston, "Canadian Defence Industrial Policy and Practice: A 
History," Canadian Defence Quarterly 18, no. 6 [special no. 2] (June 1989). 
10. Donald Creighton, Macdonald: The Young Politician-The Old Chieftain 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 325-32. 
11. See Richard A. Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border: Planning for 
War in North America, 1867-1939 (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1977), 26. 
12. John Hasek, The Disarming of Canada (Toronto: Key Porter, 1987), 105. 
13. Haycock, "That Damned Ross Rifle," 89. 
14. Canada, Debates, House of Commons, 1905 (Ottawa), p. 9122; and ibid. 1908, 
pp. 8980-94. On the history of the Ross, see Phillips, The Ross Rifle Story. 
15. Ronald G. Haycock, "Policy, Patronage, and Production," 72. 
16. Haycock, "That Damn Ross Rifle," 48-51. 
17. Extracts from Minutes of the Imperial Conference on the Naval and 
Military Defence of the Empire, 1909, Documents on Canadian External 
Relations (hereafter DCER), vol. 1,1909-1918 (Ottawa, 1967), 231-32. 
18. See Haycock, "That Damned Ross Rifle"; Duguid, The Ross Rifle in the 
Trenches; and Phillips, The Ross Rifle Story. 
19. George Stanley, Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People 
(Toronto: McMillan, 1974), 317. 
20. Haycock, "That Damn Ross Rifle," 55. 
21. Morton and Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon, 81; see also Canadian Liberal Party, "War Contract Scandals," as investigated by the Public 
40 
AARON PLAMONDON 
Accounts Committee of the House of Commons, 1915; also "The Purchase 
of Boots," as investigated by the special "Boot Committee" appointed by 
the House of Commons, 1915. 
22. J.A. Foster, Muskets to Missiles: A History of Canada's Ground Forces (Toronto: 
Methuen, 1987), 100. 
23. Desmond Morton, When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First 
World War (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 1994), 33. 
24. This was the conclusion of the British Commissioners who investigated the 
Canadian munitions industry. See Carnegie, History of the Munitions Supply 
in Canada, 2-8. 
25. For more on this, see Aaron Plamondon, "The Great War and Imperial 
Weapons and Equipment Standardization," in Perspectives on War: New Views 
on Historical and Contemporary Security Issues, ed. J.P. Marchant and Chris 
Bullock (Calgary: Society for Military and Strategic Studies, 2003). 
26. Air Board Committee Minutes, NAC, meeting no. 216, 9 Jan. 1922, RG 24, 
vol. 3192. 
27. Imperial Conference of 1926, Summary of Proceedings, NAC, Christie 
Papers, MG 30 E 15, vol. 12, reel C-3883. 
28. Lt. Col. George A. Drew, "Salesmen of Death: The Truth about War 
Markets," Maclean's, 1 Aug. 1931. 
29. Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999), 67-69. 
30. Memorandum by Deputy Minister, L.R. LaFléche, 20 Jan. 1938, NAC, RG 24, 
reel C-5091. 
31. CP Stacey, Military Problems of Canada, 127. 
32. CP Stacey, Anns, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-45 
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), 101-02. 
33. Report of the Royal Commission on the Bren Machine Gun Contract, 29 Dec. 
1938, NAC, RG 24, reel C-5091. 
34. For more on the Defence Purchasing Board, see Bill 38, Canada, House of 
Commons, Debates, IV, 1939, NAC, RG 24, C-5091. 
35. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 102; for the joint ownership of the 
plant by the Canadian and British governments, see Memorandum from 
Deputy Minister L.R. LaFléche to Colonel D.E. Dewar, Master General of 
the Ordnance, 18 Jan. 1938, NAC, RG 24, reel C-5091. 
36. Randall Wakelam, Flights of Fancy: RCAF Fighter Procurement, 1945-54 
(unpublished Master's thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1997), 2. 
37. H. Duncan Hall and C C Wrigley, Studies of Overseas Supply (London: 
Longmans, 1956), 91-107. 
38. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 487. 
39. Granatstein, Arming the Nation; see also Hennessy, "The Industrial Front." 
40. Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, II (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), 
60; and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 487. 
41. W.G.D. Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the 
North-west Atlantic," in RCN in Retrospect, 1910-68, ed. J.A. Boutilier 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), 156. 
42. This and the rest of the paragraph were retrieved from David Zimmerman, 
The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa: How Admirals, Scientists and Politicians 
41 
EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT IN CANADA 
Impeded the Development of High Technology in Canada's Wartime Navy 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 3-8 [quotations are from p. 5]. 
43. Canadian Forces, "The Armoured Corps Story," Sentinel (June 1966): 32-33. 
44. Granatstein, Canada's Industrial War Effort, 1939-45, 11-12; for more on the 
history of the RAM tank, see Clive M. Law, Making Tracks: Tank Production 
in Canada (Ottawa: Service Publications, 2001); and Graham Broad, "Not 
Competent to Produce Tanks: The Ram and Tank Production in Canada, 
1939-1945," Canadian Military History 11 (Winter 2002). 
45. David J. Bercuson, True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), 179. 
46. For a full discussion on the Canadian-American defence relationship 
during the war, see S.D. Pierce and A.F.W. Plumptre, "Canada's Relations 
with War Time Agencies in Washington," Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Political Science 11, no. 3 (Aug. 1945); R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, 
Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From the Great War to the Cold War 
(Toronto: A.M. Hakkert, 1975); and H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply 
(London: Longmans, 1955). 
47. J.L. Granatstein, "The American Influence on the Canadian Military, 
1939-1963," Canadian Military History 2, no. 1 (1993): 66. 
48. It was first proposed at a meeting of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence 
in 1945. See Stanley Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States 
and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History 
(OCMH), 1959), 334-35. For the actual agreement, see "Joint Statement by 
the Governments of Canada and the United States of America Regarding 
Defence Co-operation Between the Two Countries and Statement by the 
Prime Minister Mr. W.L. Mackenzie King," 12 Feb. 1947, in Canadian Foreign 
Policy 1945-54: Selected Speeches and Documents, ed. R.A McKay (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1970), 228. 
49. See Peter Michael Archambault, The Informal Alliance: Anglo-Canadian Defence 
Relations, 1945-60 (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Calgary, 1997). 
50. Middlemiss, A Pattern of Cooperation, 83-85. 
51. See Plamondon, Casting off the Yoke. 
52. Letter from FT. Smye, AGM Sales and Contracts. A.V. Roe to G/C J.A. Easton, 
27 Jan. 1947, NAC, RG 24, vol. 5404, file 60-5-19. 
53. Wakelam, Flights of Fancy, 71. 
54. Wakelam, RCAF Fighter Procurement, 157. 
55. Robert Bothwell, "Defense and Industry in Canada 1935-1970," in War, 
Business and World Military-Industrial Complexes, ed. B.F. Cooling (New York: 
Associated Faculty Print Inc., 1981), 115. 
56. Wakelam, RCAF Fighter Procurement, 201-03, 236. 
57. Marc Milner, "A Canadian Perspective on Canadian and American 
Relations Since 1945," in Fifty Years of Canada-United States Cooperation: The 
Road From Ogdensburg, ed. JJ. Sokolsky and JT. Jockel (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1992), 152. 
58. For more on these developments, see S.M. Davis, "The St. Laurent Decision: 
Genesis of a Canadian Fleet," in RCN in Transition, 1910-1985, ed. W.A.B. 
Douglas (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988). 
42 
AARON PLAMONDON 
59. See J.H.W. Knox, "An Engineer's Outline of RCN History," in RCN in 
Retrospect, 1910-1968, ed. J.A. Boutilier (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1982), 317. 
60. Rear-Admiral S. Mathwin Davis, "Naval Procurement, 1950-1965," in 
Canada's Defence Industrial Base: The Political Economy of Preparedness and 
Procurement, ed. D.G. Haglund (Kingston: R.P. Frye, 1988), 97. 
61. Knox, "An Engineer's Outline of RCN History," 320. 
62. Milner, Canada's Navy, 214-15. 
63. This and the rest of the paragraph were based on Michael Hennessy's "The 
RCN and the Post War Naval Revolution, 1955-1964," presented at the 1992 
Canadian Historical Association's annual conference in Charlottetown, 
PEI, pp. 8, 16. A copy of the presentation was given to the author by Dr. 
Hennessy. 
64. Milner, Canada's Navy, 222-23. 
65. Granatstein, Canada's Army, 320. 
66. David J. Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 23. 
67. Ibid., 56, 71; see also Granatstein, "The American Influence on the Canadian 
Military," 69. 
68. See David J. Bercuson, "Canada, NATO, and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why 
Canada Made a Difference (But Not for Very Long)," in Making a Difference? 
Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, ed. J. English and N. 
Hillmer (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992). 
69. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 5 Feb. 1951,1, 90-97. 
70. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 13 Feb. 1951,1, 305. 
71. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 23 Feb. 1951,1, 613. 
72. Grieg Stewart, Shutting Down the National Dream: AM. Roe and the Tragedy 
of the Avro Arrow (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Ltd., 1988); James Dow, 
The Arrow (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, Ltd., 1997); Palmiro 
Campagna, Storms of Controversy: The Secret Avro Arrow Files Revealed (Toronto: 
Stoddart, 1992); Julius Lukasiewicz, "Canada's Encounter with High-Speed 
Aeronautics," Technology and Culture 27, no. 2 (Apr. 1986): 223-61. 
73. Desmond Morton, Canadian Military History: From Champlain to the CulfWar 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), 240. 
74. Middlemiss, The Case of the Canadian-American Defence Production, 188. 
75. Lt. General Guy Simonds, "Where We've Gone Wrong on Defence," 
Maclean's (23 June 1956): 23, 26. 
76. Morton, Canadian Military History, 243. 
77. For more on the Heller, see Archambault, The Informal Alliance, 311-18. 
78. For more on the Bobcat, see ibid., 311-18 [quotation is on p. 318]. 
79. For the complete history of the arrangements, see Middlemiss, The Case of 
the Canadian-American Defence Production, 215; for those who believe that 
the defence production sharing agreements only came about after Canada 
cancelled the Arrow programme and had effectively abandoned future 
43 

AARON PLAMONDON 
94. Peter Charlton, Leo Pettipas, and Michael Whitby, eds., "Certified Serviceable" 
Swordfish to Sea King: The Technical Story of Canadian Naval Aviation by Those 
Who Made It So (N/A: CNATH Book Project, 1995), 395. 
95. Milner, Canada's Navy, 265. 
96. This and the following paragraph were retrieved from Middlemiss, 
"Defence Procurement in Canada," 401-02. 
97. "Definition Contract Proposals Evaluation Report," New Shipborne Aircraft 
(NSA) Project Management Office, Aug. 1987, included in a multi-volume 
package presented to Kim Campbell after she became Prime Minister in 
regards to the situation of the NSA program, retrieved from T4SCconsulting 
firm (hereafter TASC), Ottawa, briefing package 1, document 1, 1-2; see 
also Thomas Lynch, "New Shipborne Helicopter Program," Canada's Navy 
(Annual, 1987-88), 98-101; and idem, "Canada's NSA Program: And Then 
There Was One," Canada's Navy (Annual, 1988-89), 116-17. 
98. "StaffRequirements-RCN Helicopters," 1-2. 
99. "Definition Contract Proposals Evaluation Report," 1-1, pp. 1-2. 
100. Middlemiss, "Defence Procurement in Canada," 403-04. 
101. This and the next paragraph are based on the Defence White Paper 1987 
(Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1987), 43, 67, 89. 
102. Douglas Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947-85 
(Kingston: R.P. Frye, 1987), 138. 
103. The section on the CF-18 maintenance contract was retrieved from 
Middlemiss, "Defence Procurement in Canada," 402-03; for more on the 
CF-18 selection process, see Paul Manson, "The CF-18 Hornet: Canada's 
New Fighter Aircraft," Canadian Defence Quarterly 10, no. 1 (Summer 1980). 
104. "Aide Memoire on the New Shipborne Aircraft (NSA) Project," Nov. 1991, 
T4SC, briefing package 1, document 12, p. 12. Document distributed 
to various ministries in November 1991 by the Ministry of Supply and 
Services to provide them with information on the status of the NSA 
project. 
105. Frank L. Boyd, Jr., "The Politics of Canadian Defence Procurement: The New 
Fighter Aircraft Decision," in Haglund, Canada's Defence Industrial Base, 142. 
106. Retrieved from Westland's official website on 2 June 2006, <http://www. 
whl.co.uk/pdfs/history _rotor_a_s.pdf>. 
107. D.W. Middlemiss, "Canadian Defence Funding: Heading Towards Crisis?" 
Canadian Defence Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Autumn 1991), 13. 
108. "Settlement Reached with EH Industries for the EH-101 Helicopter 
Program," Neics Release, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
23 Jan. 1996. 
109. This and the following three lines were retrieved from A. Crosby, "Project 
Management in DND," Canadian Defence Quarterly 18, no. 6 [special no. 2] 
(June 1989), 59. 
110. Brian Akitt, The Sea King Replacement Project: A Lesson in Failed Civil-Military 
Relations (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2003), 23. 
45 

AARON PLAMONDON 
132. This and the rest of the paragraph were retrieved from Daniel Leblanc, 
"Boeing Deal $8 Billion Handshake with Bush, Liberals Say," Globe and 
Mail, 6 July 2006. 
133. Daniel Leblanc, "Aircraft 'On Order'," Globe nnd Mnil, 29 Jan. 2008. 
134. Steven Chase, "Pullout by Key U.S. Manufacturer Thins Ranks of Drone 
Bidders," Globe nnd Mail, 8 May 2008. 
135. "Canada First Defence Procurement-Joint Support Ship," DND, online Nczcs 
Room Bnckgrounder, 26 June 2006, BG-06.015; see also "Canada Issues RFP for 
CDN $2.9 B 'Joint Support Ship' Project," Defence Industry Dnily, 1 Dec. 2006. 
136. Reporf on Plans and Priorities 2007-08, 23. 
137. See Craig Stone, "An Examination of the Armoured Personnel Carrier 
Replacement Project," Canadian Military Journal (Summer 2001), 63. 
138. David Pugliese, "Armoured Vehicles Hit Their Limits," Ottaica Citizen, 6 
May 2008. 
139. David Pugliese, "Air Force Needs $540 Million to Keep Flying," Ottawa 
Citizen, 17 Apr. 2008; idem, "Navy at Risk of Running Aground," Ottawa 
Citizen, 18 Apr. 2008; idem, "Army Pushed to Breaking Point," Ottawa 
Citizen, 19 Apr. 2008. 
140. Chief of the Defence Staff, Annual Report, 2003-04; and David Pugliese, 
"Afghan War Leaves Forces Unable to Buy New Rescue Planes," Ottnwn 
Citizen, 17 Apr. 2007. 
141. Murray Brewster, "Former Dutch Tanks to be Upgraded in Germany," 
Cnnndinn Press, 18 Feb. 2008. 
142. Bercuson, Plamondon, and Szeto, Opnque Window. 
143. Status Report on Major Crown Projects for the DND, Report on Pinns nnd 
Priorities, DND (2007-08). 
144. As stated before the Standing Committee on Defence, 7 Mar. 2007. 
145. For this and the rest of his recommendations, see Reinventing Cnnndinn 
Defence Procurement: A View From the Inside (Kingston: Breakout Educational 
Network, 2006). 
146. Department of National Defence, Chief Review Services, Risk Analysis of 
Operations and Maintenance Contracts, Apr. 2007. 
147. See the Report of the Minister of National Defence's Advisory Committee on 
Administrative Efficiency at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/AE/report/ 
secl-2_e.htm>. 
148. Sharon Hobson, "Where's the Transparency?" Canadian Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Institute, <http://www.cdfai.org/newsletters/newsletterswinter2007. 
htm#Article:%20Where's%20the%20Transparency>. 
149. For more on this, see the conclusions of Bercuson, Plamondon, and Szeto, 
Opaque Window. 
150. Retrieved on 4 Apr. 2008 from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/Paper 
PromisesGranatstein>. 
151. Canada First Defence Strategy, retrieved from the DND website on 12 May 2008, 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2648>. 
47 


T h e C e n t r e f o r M i l i t a r y a n d S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s at 
t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l g a r y p r o m o t e s e x c e l l e n c e i n 
m i l i t a r y a n d s t r a t e g i c s t u d i e s . Its m e m b e r s w o r k i n 
a r e a s i n c l u d i n g m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y , C a n a d i a n d e f e n c e 
p o l i c y , a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c a n d s e c u r i t y 
i s s u e s . C a l g a r y •s i n M i l i t a r y 
S t u d i e s p r e s e n t s t h e i r r e s e a r c h t o t h e p u b l i c . 
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number 2, 2008. Upcoming papers will address relations between the 
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ABSTRACT: The procurement of military weapons and equipment 
in Canada has historically been controlled by partisan political 
considerations rather than a clear desire to increase the capability of the 
military. This research demonstrates the ahistorical nature of military 
acquisitions in Canada and how few lessons have been learned from a 
long list of project failures, owing largely to the political misdirection 
of the procurement process and the weakness of the civil-military 
relationship in Canada. 
UNIVERSITY OF »I^ÏÏÏÎÏSÎîri 
C A L G A R Y 
9^780889^53328811 
CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES 
MacKimmie LibraryTower 701 
University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW $7 50 
Calgary, AB T2N 1 N4 
Tel. 403.220.4038 / Fax. 403.282.0594 
www.cmss.ucalgary.ca / cmsspub@ucalgary.ca 
